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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
To a surprising degree, the legal history of the environment has been
written by nuisance law. There is no common law doctrine that approach-
es nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and
of technological abuse .... Nuisance theory and case law is the common
law backbone of modem environmental and energy law.
1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
AIR AND WATER § 1.1, at 1-2 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law of nuisance has been described in such unflattering
terms as a "legal grab bag,"' "a good word to beg a question with,"2 and by
Prosser himself as an "impenetrable jungle." 3  Nonetheless, the South
Carolina jungle is worth exploring because the nuisance cause of action has
afforded relief in this state against the ill effects of a wide variety of activities,
including an automobile junkyard,4 funeral home,5 baseball games,6 fertilizer
plant,7 sawmill,' religious services, 9 dog pen,' 0 sewage treatment la-
goon," truck terminal, 2 gold mine, 3 and rock quarry. 14 In South Caro-
lina, as elsewhere, no field of human endeavor is immune from being
characterized, under the right set of facts and circumstances, as a nuisance. 15
1. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Tyler, 482 F.2d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir. 1973).
2. Id. (quoting Ezra R. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317,
326 (1914)).
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 616
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS]; see also 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2.4, at 48 (1986) ("[N]uisance law straddles the
legal universe, virtually defies synthesis, and generates case law to suit every taste." (footnotes
omitted)).
4. Bowlin v. George, 239 S.C. 429, 123 S.E.2d 528 (1962).
5. Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577 (1942).
6. Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, Inc., 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950).
7. Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co., 102 S.C. 442, 86 S.E. 817 (1915).
8. White v. Halsey Lumber Co., 96 S.C. 420, 81 S.E. 11 (1914).
9. Morison v. Rawlinson, 193 S.C. 25, 7 S.E.2d 635 (1940).
10. Blanks v. Rawson, 296 S.C. 110, 370 S.E.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1988).
11. Lever v. Wilder Mobile Homes, Inc., 283 S.C. 452, 322 S.E.2d 692 (Ct. App. 1984).
12. Dill v. Dance Freight Lines, 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966).
13. Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1909).
14. Davis v. Palmetto Quarries Co., 212 S.C. 496, 48 S.E.2d 329 (1948).
15. Despite the large number of federal and state environmental statutes, the common law
[Vol. 45:337
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This article will first present a brief review of the nuisance doctrine's
history. Next, it will discuss the "special injury rule" as it applies to both
public and private nuisances. Then, the focus will turn to private nuisance
claims, including the elements, possible defenses, and remedies. Finally, the
future role of nuisance in environmental litigation will be explored.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The term "nuisance" is derived from t&e Latin word nocumentum,
meaning simply "harm." 16 In England, nuisance described any interference
with a person's right to use and enjoy his land. Blackstone defined the term
as "any thing done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or
hereditaments of another." 7 The South Carolina definition is basically the
same: Nuisance is "anything which works hurt, inconvenience, or damage;
anything which essentially interferes with the enjoyment of life or proper-
ty.,,s 18
remains an individual's principal means of obtaining redress for environmental harm. Although
many statutes allow "citizen suits" against violators, the citizens who prevail will secure monetary
relief only for their attorneys and the government. See generally Jeffrey G. Miller, Private
Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws (pts. 1-3), 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10309 (Oct. 1983), 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10063, 10407 (Feb. & Nov. 1984)
(analyzing the mechanics of bringing citizens' suits and the remedies available to private plaintiffs
under federal environmental statutes). These suits certainly promote the public interest in
improving environmental quality, but the private interest in securing relief for environmental
injuries has traditionally been, and will likely continue to be, resolved under the common law.
Indeed, South Carolina's basic environmental statute, the Pollution Control Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 48-1-10 to -350 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1993), specifically reserves all rights and
remedies "existing in equity or under the common law." S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-240 (Law. Co-
op. 1987).
The common law of nuisance in South Carolina has recently become a subject of national
interest. In the widely publicized decision of the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), the Court considered Lucas's claim that South
Carolina's prohibition against any development of his two beachfront lots amounted to an
unconstitutional taking of property. The Court held that the state could avoid the payment of
compensation only by showing that the intended development of the lots would create a nuisance
under state law. Id. at 2900. The case was remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court for
this determination. Id. at 2901-02.
On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the "Coastal Council has not
persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas's desired use of
his land; nor has our research uncovered any such common law principle." Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, _ S.C._, _, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1992). The court then
remanded the case to the trial court to determine damages, but the parties later settled.
16. F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480, 481 (1949).
17. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216.
18. State ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 191, 63 S.E. 884, 889
(1909), quoted in Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 240 S.C. 244, 253, 125 S.E.2d 628, 632
(1962); Peden v. Furman Univ., 155 S.C. 1, 16, 151 S.E. 907, 912 (1930). Although "life" is
referred to in the definition, the plaintiff must have some interest in real property in order to state
a nuisance cause of action. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 3
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The roots of the nuisance doctrine are traceable to two thirteenth century
English common law causes of action for interference with real
property-trespass and assize of novel disseisin.19 To recover in trespass,
landowners had to show the defendant's actual entry onto their property or the
entry of some tangible matter that the defendant put in motion.2' Disseisin
required proof, not only of an entry, but also of the defendant's intent to
dispossess, or "disseise," the landowner from the land. Disseisin has been
described as "trespass plus."21
However, neither trespass nor disseisin applied when the interference
arose from conduct occurring entirely on the defendant's property. Thus,
during the thirteenth century, a new writ, assise of nuisance, was developed
that permitted injured landowners to seek redress against this kind of "off site"
conduct.' Later, when the English courts lessened the rigid rules and proce-
dures of the common law courts by developing the general writ of action on
the case, nuisance claims were increasingly pursued under this writ.u
At the same time, the courts were developing a criminal remedy for
interference with the rights of the general public. These so-called public
19. See A.K.R. KiRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 36 (7th ed. 1984) (discussing the
elements of trespass and assize of novel disseisin).
20. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 13, at 70-72.
21. KIRALFY, supra note 19, at 36 (citing C.H.S. FIFOoT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE
COMMON LAW 57 (photo. reprint 1970) (1949)).
22. See generally William A. McRae, Jr., TheDevelopment of Nuisance in the Early Common
Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 27 (1948) (tracing the history of public and private nuisances from
medieval times); P.H. Winfield, Nuisance as a Tort, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 189, 190-92 (1931)
(relating the concept of nuisance as a tort to the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, negligence
principles, and trespass to land).
The South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the historical distinction between
nuisance and trespass: "A trespass is a direct and forcible invasion of one's property, producing
a direct and immediate result, and a nuisance is a species of invasion of another's property,
producing indirect or consequential injury by agencies wrongfully operating outside of the
property injured." Allen v. Union Oil & Mfg. Co., 59 S.C. 571, 578, 38 S.E. 274, 276-77
(1901) (citing H.G. WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 13 (3d ed. 1893)); see also Ravan v.
Greenville County, ___S.C. __, 434 S.E.2d 296, 306 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The distinctioiibetween
trespass and nuisance is that trespass is any intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the
exclusive possession of his property, whereas nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable
interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment [of his property].") (citing WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.13, at 154 (1977)).
However, nuisance and trespass are close cousins, and in environmental litigation it is rare
for the defendant's activity not to be challenged under both causes of action. For example, "the
flooding of the plaintiff's land, which is a trespass, is also a nuisance if it is repeated or of long
duration." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. e (1979) [hereinafterRESTATEMENT].
Indeed, "the line between trespass and nuisance has become wavering and uncertain." PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 87, at 622.
23. See, e.g., William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610) (action on case for
nuisance caused by a "swine stye").
4
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nuisances, which could involve "obstructed highways, lotteries, unlicensed
stage-plays, common scolds, and a host of other rag ends of the law," were
subject to prosecution by the Crown.' The remedy for public nuisances
"remained exclusively a criminal one until the sixteenth century, when it was
recognized that a private individual who had suffered special damage might
have a civil action in tort for the invasion of the public right."'
Despite a shared surname, private and public nuisances have little in
common. A private nuisance is "a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of
rights in land,"26 while a public nuisance is "a species of catch-all criminal
offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at
large." 27 Indeed, "it would have been fortunate if they had been called from
the beginning by different names."2" Unfortunately, the distinction between
the two doctrines is frequently overlooked in the case law, contributing to
much of the confusion surrounding the law of nuisance.
III. THE SPECIAL INJURY RULE
Like the English courts, the South Carolina Supreme Court has subscribed
to a broad definition of public nuisance: "'A public nuisance exists wherever
acts or conditions are subversive of public order, decency, or morals, or
constitute an obstruction of public rights.'"29
The kinds of "acts or conditions" that have been held to be public
nuisances under this standard include maintaining a "disorderly house,"30
24. Newark, supra note 16, at 482.
25. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 86, at 618 (footnote omitted).
26. Id. (footnote omitted).
27. Id. (footnote omitted).
28. Id.
29. State v. Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 495, 18 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1942) (citing 20 R.C.L.
Nuisances § 7 (1929)). The supreme court has added that a nuisance, to be public, must affect
a number of people. See Morison v. Rawlinson, 193 S.C. 25, 32, 7 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1940)
(stating that "a public nuisance must be in a public place or where the public frequently
congregate"); see also Emory v. Hazard Powder Co., 22 S.C. 476, 483 (1885) ("There may be
a private as well as a public nuisance, the distinction being dependentupon the number affected,
but the fact of nuisance itself does not depend upon number."); State v. Rankin, 3 S.C. 438,447
(1872) ("Whether it is the one or the other, depends upon the extent of its existence."). But see
Bowlin v. George, 239 S.C. 429,434-35, 123 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1962) ("[A] nuisance may affect
a considerable number of persons in the same manner and yet not be a public nuisance. .. .")
(quoting Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co., 102 S.C. 442, 450-51, 86 S.E. 817, 820 (1915));
RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 821B cmt. g ("Conduct does not become a public nuisance
merely because it interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by a large number of persons.
There must be some interference with a public right.").
30. Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 18 S.E.2d 372.
5
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selling alcohol,3' obstructing a navigable river," and operating a hazardous
waste landfill.33 Furthermore, the use of buildings for prostitution34 and
gambling35 are defined by statute as public nuisances, while certain crimes,
such as malicious injury to real property,36 may involve public nuisances.
In addition, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC) has authority under the Pollution Control Act "to prevent or
abate nuisances" affecting public health.37 Another statute allows DHEC to
issue orders and rules "for the purpose of suppressing nuisances dangerous to
the public health." 38  Pursuant to this authority, DHEC has defined public
health nuisances by regulation.39 In one well known case, DHEC relied on
the public nuisance doctrine to seek the shutdown of a chemical facility that
posed serious health risks to nearby residents.4" State and local authorities
in other jurisdictions also have used the doctrine successfully in environmental
cases.
41
Individuals, too, can seek relief against a public nuisance. Under the
"special injury rule," however, an individual can recover in tort for a public
nuisance only by establishing "some injury to himself differing in kind, and
not merely in degree, from that suffered by the general public. "42
31. State ex rel. Lyon v. City Club, 83 S.C. 509, 65 S.E. 730 (1909).
32. State v. South Carolina Ry., 28 S.C. 23, 4 S.E. 796 (1888).
33. Neal v. Darby, 282 S.C. 277, 318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-43-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
35. Id. § 16-19-140.
36. See id. § 16-11-520.
37. Id. § 48-1-280.
38. Id. § 44-1-140. It should be noted, however, that a project specifically authorized by the
legislature has been held immune from challenge as a public nuisance. Law v. City of
Spartanburg, 148 S.C. 229, 146 S.E. 12 (1928) (enjoining enforcement of a municipal ordinance
which prohibited construction of a tubercular hospital that had been specifically authorized by the
legislature), cited in Home Sales, Inc. v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 299 S.C. 70, 81, 382 S.E.2d
463, 469 (Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) ("Nothing is a public nuisance which the law itself
authorizes.").
39. See S.C. CODE REGS. 61-46 (1992).
40. See John Harleston & Kathleen M. Harleston, The Suffolk Syndrome: A Case Study in
Public Nuisance Law, 40 S.C. L. REv. 379 (1989).
41. See, e.g., State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050-52 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding corporate owner and individual principal of corporation liable under public
nuisance doctrine to abate contamination caused by prior owner); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA
Services, Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (I11. 981) (enjoined continued operation of hazardous waste
landfill as an anticipated public nuisance).
42. Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co., 102 S.C. 442, 450, 86 S.E. 817, 820 (1915).
The Restatement imposes the additional requirement that the injury, even if special, must
be suffered while "exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of
interference." RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 821C(1). Plaintiffs seeking private recovery
based on a public nuisance have encountered difficulties with this requirement in other
jurisdictions. Some courts have dismissed the public nuisance claim because the plaintiff did not
6
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Much of the South Carolina case law on nuisances involves application
of the "special injury rule." For example, pecuniary loss resulting from the
obstruction of a navigable stream is not a "special injury,"43 contrary to the
Restatement position." On the other hand, a suit can be maintained when the
obstruction causes physical damage to the plaintiff's boat.45 Similarly, the
court has found a special injury when the obstruction of a public road
materially impaired a plaintiff's access to property. 46 However, if other
feasible means of access exist, the court will not find a special injury.47
When the nuisance interferes with both a public right and the use and
enjoyment of the plaintiff's own land, the nuisance is both a private and public
one. In this case, the plaintiff may maintain an action for the private nuisance
itself and for the public nuisance because the particular harm suffered is of a
suffer a special injury while exercising the public right. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules,
Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 316 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) (holding that plaintiff, in
cleaning up its own property, suffered no special damage because it was not harmed while
exercising the public right to pure water); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 936-37 (D. Me. 1990) (finding that loss of use and enjoyment of
private land is not a special harm in the exercise of a public right); cf. Burgess v. MAN Tamano,
370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (holding that commercial fishers and clam diggers could
maintain private action for public nuisance when an oil spill interfered with the exercise of their
public right to harvest fish and clams), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977).
The South Carolina appellate courts have not faced the issue of whether the plaintiff, in a
private action based on a public nuisance, must prove that the special injury was sustained in the
actual exercise of a public right.
43. South Carolina Steamboat Co. v. Wilmington, C. & A. R.R., 46 S.C. 327, 24 S.E. 337
(1896) (holding that lost profits caused by the obstruction of a river are not a special injury);
Steamboat Co. v. Railroad Co., 30 S.C. 539, 9 S.E. 650 (1889) (holding that expense incurred
in removing portion of boat to go under defendant's bridge is not a special injury); Carey v.
Brooks, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 365 (1833) (holding that expense incurred in removing an obstruction
and loss resulting from shipping delays are not special injuries). In these cases, the court also
held that the injury must be not only special but direct. This proposition, however, is contrary
to the South Carolina rule that allows the recovery of consequential damages in tort actions. F.
PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 499-501 (1990).
44. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 821C cmt. h, illustiation 10.
45. Drews v. E.P. Burton & Co., 76 S.C. 362, 57 S.E. 176 (1907).
46. Huggin v. Gaffney Dev. Co., 229 S.C. 340, 92 S.E.2d 883 (1956); see also Bethel
Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Greenville, 211 S.C. 442, 45 S.E.2d 841 (1947)
(reversing city council resolution abandoning part of street that provided the only access to
petitioner's church); Brown v. Hendricks, 211 S.C. 395, 45 S.E.2d 603 (1947) (allowing private
cause of action brought by adjoining landowners of obstructed public alley); Gray & Shealy v.
Charleston & W.C. Ry., 81 S.C. 370, 62 S.E. 442 (1908) (holding petitioner entitled to a new
trial on the issue of defendant's obstruction of a public road where this issue was decided in the
trial court without testimony).
47. Burrell v. Kirkland, 242 S.C. 201, 130 S.E.2d 470 (1963) (per curiam) (dissolving
injunction that prevented obstruction of public road because plaintiff had the same means of
access as others); Cherry v. City of Rock Hill, 48 S.C. 553, 26 S.E. 798 (1897) (finding no
special harm from relocation of public road when plaintiff had an alternative route).
7
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different kind than that suffered by the public.48 If possible, the plaintiff
should include a public nuisance claim in the complaint because "prescriptive
rights, the statute of limitations and laches do not run against the public right,
even when the action is brought by a private person for particular harm. "49
The special injury rule does not apply to private nuisance claims. Yet the
South Carolina Supreme Court overlooked this basic principle in several early
decisions, with astonishing consequences. For example, in Belton v. Wateree
Power Co.,50 the plaintiff brought a private nuisance action, alleging that the
defendant's dam created "stagnant pools which bred malarial mosquitoes,
causing sickness, the removal of his tenants, and consequent depreciation of
the value of his land."51 At trial the plaintiff recovered judgment, but the
supreme court reversed because "the activities and effects of the mosquitoes
were not confined to the premises of the plaintiff, but were prevalent in that
whole community" and, therefore, "the damage suffered by the plaintiff was
not peculiar to himself.""2 Accordingly, the nuisance was found to be public,
not private, and the complaint was dismissed. 3
The court reached the same result on nearly identical facts in Baltzeger
v. Carolina Midland Railway,54 in which the plaintiff's private nuisance
complaint alleged that the ponded water emitted "nauseous odors and gases,
which poison and pollute the air in and around the plaintiff's . . . dwelling
house .... and. .. caused the death of one of plaintiffs children, who was
made sick by the offensive and nauseous gases emitted from [the] stagnant
waters."55 The court held, however, that because "the causes which led to
the plaintiff's injury might reasonably be expected to affect others in the
neighborhood..... his injury was not special."6
Belton and Baltzeger are wrong on all counts. First, the court should not
have applied the special injury rule to the private nuisance claims. Second,
even if the claims were based on a public nuisance, interfering with the use
and enjoyment of the plaintiffs property is clearly a special injury. Surely it
is unfair-indeed perverse-to allow a defendant to escape liability in a private
nuisance action because the impact of his conduct is so severe that the entire
community suffers from it."
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 821C cmt. e.
49. Id.; see also State v. Rankin, 3 S.C. 438, 448-49 (1872) (finding no prescriptive right to
maintain a public nuisance).
50. 123 S.C. 291, 115 S.E. 587 (1922) (en bane).
51. Id. at 295, 115 S.E. at 588.
52. Id. at 296, 115 S.E. at 588.
53. Id.
54. 54 S.C. 242, 32 S.E. 358 (1899).
55. Id. at 244, 32 S.E. at 359.
56. Id. at 250, 32 S.E. at 361.
57. The reasoning in Baltzeger is particularly illogical. To obtain damages for the
8
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Later South Carolina decisions recognize the proper approach. InDeason
v. Southern Railway,5" a divided court affirmed the judgment entered on a
jury verdict against the defendant who obstructed the flow from the plaintiff's
pond.5 9  In Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co.,' the plaintiff alleged that
odors, dust, and grit from the defendant's fertilizer plant polluted the air,
ruined her vegetable garden, and caused the plaintiffs nervousness and
anxiety. The court held the special injury rule was irrelevant, stating:
IThe [special injury] rule does not apply, and there is no reason for its
application, when a plaintiff states, as his cause of action, that which is
prima facie only a private nuisance, even though it may appear from his
complaint that a determinate number of other persons are or may be
similarly affected by it, for a nuisance may affect a considerable number
of persons in the same manner and yet not be a public nuisance, and, in
that event, if the individuals so affected were denied the private remedy of
an action, they would be without any remedy at all, because, if it is not a
public nuisance, it is not subject to indictment.
61
In a case involving the application of South Carolina law, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals expressly approved this principle in Sullivan v.
American Manufacturing Co. 62 Reviewing the cases decided by the South
Carolina Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit determined that Deason had
implicitly overruled Baltzeger.63 The court distinguished Belton as not being
"a nuisance case at all, but involv[ing] the right to recover consequential
damages resulting from the damming of a stream under legislative authority. "I
accumulation of surface water, the plaintiffs had to establish the presence of a nuisance per se.
See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text. The court found the complaint insufficient to
support a claim of nuisance per se, id. at 247, 32 S.E. at 360, and yet dismissed the complaint
because the nuisance was a public one. Id.
Belton and Baltzeger are not the only cases in which the court has improperly applied the
special injury rule. See, e.g., McMeekin v. Central Carolina Power Co., 80 S.C. 512, 61 S.E.
1020 (1908) (dismissing the plaintiff's suit despite the allegation that the defendant's dam had
inundated the plaintiff's property); Manson v. South Bound R.R., 64 S.C. 120, 41 S.E. 832
(1902) (denying standing to owners of property on a bluff overlooking a public park to challenge
the establishment of a railroad station in the park); Threatt v. Brewer Mining Co., 49 S.C. 95,
26 S.E. 970 (1896) (reversing judgment in plaintiffs favor merely because plaintiff, whose
principal complaint was that his farm lands had been destroyed by tailings from defendant's mine,
was allowed to testify about how the tailings interfered with his use of two public roads).
58. 142 S.C. 328, 140 S.E. 575 (1927).
59. Id. at 333, 140 S.E.2d at 576.
60. 102 S.C. 442, 86 S.E. 817 (1915).
61. Id. at 450-51, 86 S.E. at 820.
62. 33 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1929).
63. Id. at 694.
64. Id. at 694-95.
1994]
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Bowlin v. George65 most recently addressed this issue. The plaintiff
complained that "an enormous and extensive automobile junk yard" had
become a "breeding place for mosquitoes," causing the plaintiff and his wife
"to remain indoors and preventing them from enjoying their property and the
simple pleasures of life to which they are entitled."6' Relying on Baltzeger
and Belton, the defendant demurred, arguing that the plaintiff had not alleged
a special injury.67 The trial court overruled the demurrer, and a unanimous
supreme court affirmed, stating:
Whether the junk yard in question is or may become a public nuisance
need not be decided, for under the allegations of the complaint it is as to
respondent a private nuisance. He is not complaining of the violation of
a right of a public nature or one held in common with the rest of the
public. He alleges the invasion of a private right, namely, the interference
with the reasonable enjoyment of his property and the depreciation in its
value. We think it is quite clear that he is entitled to maintain this
68action.
The court found Woods "conclusive of the question," 69 Sullivan a "well
considered opinion,"7 and Baltzeger and Belton "distinguishable."71
In sum, although cases like Baltzeger and Belton lurk in the background,
there is little doubt that the special injury rule is irrelevant in private nuisance
actions in this state. Even where private recovery against a public nuisance
is sought, interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's own
property will be deemed a "special injury. "72
65. 239 S.C. 429, 123 S.E.2d 528 (1962).
66. Id. at 431, 123 S.E.2d at 529.
67. Id. at 433, 123 S.E.2d at 530.
68. Id. at 435, 123 S.E.2d at 531.
69. Id.
70. Bowlin, 239 S.C. at 436, 123 S.E.2d at 531.
71. Id. at 436, 123 S.E.2d at 531-32. It should be noted that in Jones v. Seaboard Air Line
Railway, 67 S.C. 181, 194, 45 S.E. 188, 193 (1903), which preceded Belton, the court held that
interference with "the right to the unimpaired use of [plaintiff's] land on the banks of the river"
constituted a special injury.
72. An interesting issue is whether a citizen, in the role of a "private attorney general" rather
than as one seeking personal relief, has standing to challenge a public nuisance. Under the
Restatement, any citizen, as a representative of the general public, has the right to maintain an
action to enjoin a public nuisance. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 821C(2)(c).
The South Carolina appellate courts have not resolved this issue. The supreme court had
the opportunity to do so in Sloan v. City of Greenville, 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959),
in which a taxpayer contended that a public nuisance or "purpresture" would be created by the
issuance of a building permit to construct a parking building that would encroach upon the public
streets. The city challenged the plaintiff's standing; however, the court refused, on procedural
grounds, to address the question and then held that the city lacked the authority to issue the
[Vol. 45:337
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IV. PRIVATE NUISANCE ACTIONS: WHAT DOES THE
PLAINTIFF HAVE TO PROVE?
This section considers what the plaintiff must prove to establish the
defendant's liability in a private nuisance action. The elements to be
considered include (1) interest in land, (2) interference, and (3) the nature of
the defendant's conduct.
A. Interest in Land
The plaintiff must have some legal interest in land to state a claim for
private nuisance.73 Any interest in land is sufficient to support a suit; fee
simple ownership is not required. For example, tenants have been allowed to
recover in South Carolina;7' in other jurisdictions, even persons in posses-
sion75 and easement holders76 have maintained nuisance actions. Recovery,
however, is "limited to the interest of the plaintiff. Thus a tenant may recover
damages for the depreciation in market value of his term, but not for that of
the reversion, in which he has no interest . . . .
B. Interference
1. Materiality Requirement
In South Carolina an action in trespass will lie for even the slightest
invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the exclusive possession of property.
78
permit. Id. at 287-88, 111 S.E.2d at 578-79.
Standing requirements have been addressed in other contexts. Contrary to the federal rule,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has allowed taxpayers to challenge the disbursement of
government funds. See, e.g., Brown v. Wingard, 285 S.C. 478, 330 S.E.2d 301 (1985) (per
curiam); Lee v. Clark, 224 S.C. 138, 77 S.E.2d 485 (1953). Otherwise, however, the general
rule is that plaintiffs must "show a personal interest other than that shared in common by all
members of the public." Blandon v. Coleman, 285 S.C. 472, 475, 330 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1985);
see also Culbertsonv. Blatt, 194 S.C. 105, 112, 9 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1940) (holding that citizens
not directly injured by an executive or legislative action do not have standing to challenge the
defendants' holding of public office) (relying on Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937)). This
rule is consistent with the "actual or imminent" injury test applied in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734-35 (1972).
73. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 87, at 621.
74. Woodstock Hardwood & Spool Mfg. Co. v. Charleston Light & Water Co., 84 S.C. 306,
63 S.E. 548 (1909).
75. Brink v. Moeschl Edwards Corrugating Co., 133 S.W. 1147 (Ky. 1911).
76. Webber v. Wright, 126 A. 737 (Me. 1924); Herman v. Roberts, 23 N.E. 442 (N.Y.
1890).
77. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 87, at 621.
78. Norvell v. Thompson, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 470 (1834); accord Snow v. City of Columbia,
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However, a claim in nuisance is actionable only if the interference with the use
and enjoyment of property is "material" or "great." 9 The underlying
principle is that "[pleople who live in organized communities must of necessity
suffer some inconvenience and annoyance from their neighbors."8° The point
at which an interference becomes actionable depends on the facts. Even
baseball games can be enjoined as a nuisance if they are accompanied by
glaring lights, deafening loudspeakers, and beer-drinking fans without access
to bathroom facilities."1
2. Anticipatory Nuisances
Satisfying the materiality test is particularly difficult where the defendant's
activity has not yet begun.' In these "anticipatory nuisance" cases, the
305 S.C. 544, 553, 409 S.E.2d 797, 802 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, Feb. 4, 1992 (stating
that any entry is wrongful and entitles the party in possession to at least nominal damages); Few
v. Keller, 63 S.C. 154, 41 S.E. 85 (1902). Contra Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co.,
709 P.2d 782, 791 (Wash. 1985) (rejecting common law rule and requiring proof of "actual and
substantial damages" in trespass actions).
79. Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 S.C. 152, 159, 130 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1963).
According to the RESTATEMENT, supra note 22: "iThere must be a real and appreciable
interference with the plaintiff's use or enjoyment of his land before he can have a cause of
action." § 821F cmt. c; accord Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (N.H. 1972) ("Essential to
a finding of either a public or a private nuisance is a determination that the interference
complained of is substantial."); see also McLauchlin v. Charlotte & S.C. R.R., 39 S.C.L. (5
Rich.) 583, 594 (1850) (landowner must anticipate some unpleasant uses of adjoining lands).
80. Winget, 242 S.C. at 159, 130 S.E.2d at 367.
81. Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, Inc., 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950). One
confusing statement in the case law needs clarification. In Crosby v. Southern Railway, 221 S.C.
135, 139, 69 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1952), the supreme court interpreted the decision in Allen v.
Union Oil & Mfg. Co., 59 S.C. 571, 38 S.E. 274 (1901), as standing for the proposition that an
actionable nuisance requires physical injury to real estate, not just discomfort, inconvenience or
personal injury. However, Allen involved the question of whether a claim for injury to real
property survived the death of the plaintiff. 59 S.C. at 579-80, 38 S.E. at 277. The court held
that only those nuisances which caused physical injury to real estate survived within the meaning
of the applicable statutory provision; it did not hold that a nuisance is actionable only if it causes
such injury, as the opinion makes clear: "So, also, smoke, dust, cinders, particles of lint cotton,
may become a nuisance, but action therefor will not survive, under the statute, unless they
injuriously and materially affect the physical condition of the real property, as distinguished from
mere annoyance, discomfort, inconvenienceor injury to the person." Id. at 579, 38 S.E. at 277.
The Restatement also makes clear that the nuisance cause of action extends beyond damage
to real property: "'Interest in use and enjoyment' also comprehends the pleasure, comfort and
enjoyment that a person normally derives from the occupancy of land." RESTATEMENT, supra
note 22, § 821D cmt. b; cf. Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co., 102 S.C. 442, 449, 86 S.E. 817,
819 (1915) (allowing testimony about the impact of the defendant's plant on members of the
plaintiff's family "because it tend[ed] to show the nature and extent of plaintiff's damages, since
she ha[d] the right to have them live with her and enjoy the comforts of her home").
82. E.g., Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 240 S.C. 244, 256-57, 125 S.E.2d 628, 634
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supreme court imposes a heavy burden on the plaintiff:
[E]quity will not interfere where the anticipated nuisance is doubtful,
contingent, or conjectural. To entitle one to injunctive relief against a
threatened or anticipated nuisance, public or private, it must appear that
a nuisance will inevitably or necessarily result from the act or thing which
it is sought to enjoin.83
There is no reported decision in South Carolina where the plaintiff has been
able to make such a showing. 4
3. Surface Waters
Where the interference with the plaintiffs land is caused by surface
waters,8 the plaintiff must overcome the "common enemy rule."86 A good
restatement of the rule is found in Johnson v. Williams:
87
The law is well settled in this State that surface water is a common enemy,
and every landowner has the right to use such means as he deems
necessary for the protection of his property from damages it would cause,
except that (1) a landowner must not handle surface water in such a way
as to create a nuisance, and (2) he must not by means of a ditch or other
artificial means collect surface water and cast it in concentrated form upon
the lands of another.88
(1962), cited in Welborn v. Page, 247 S.C. 554, 563, 148 S.E.2d 375, 379 (1966).
83. Strong, 240 S.C. at 254, 125 S.E.2d at 633.
84. See Welborn, 247 S.C. 554, 148 S.E.2d 375 (denying injunctive relief against proposed
automobile wrecking service); Strong, 240 S.C. 244, 125 S.E.2d 628 (denying injunctive relief
against proposed grocery store); Moss v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 223 S.C. 282,
75 S.E.2d 462 (1953) (refusing to issue temporary restraining order against relocation of
highway); Emory v. Hazard Powder Co., 22 S.C. 476, 483 (1885) (stating that "mere fears of
the plaintiff" are insufficient basis for nuisance action); Roach v. Combined Util. Comm'n, 290
S.C. 437, 351 S.E.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1986) (denying injunctive relief against proposed sewage
treatment plant); Charleston Comm. for Safe Water v. Commissioners of Pub. Works, 286 S.C.
10, 331 S.E.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that plaintiff failed to meet burden of showing that
proposed fluoridation of city's water supply would constitute a nuisance).
85. Surface waters have been defined as "waters of a casual and vagrant character, which ooze
through the soil, or diffuse or squander themselves over the surface, following no definite
course." Brandenburg v. Zeigler, 62 S.C. 18, 21, 39 S.E. 790, 791 (1901) (quoting Lawton v.
South Bound R. Co., 61 S.C. 548, 552, 39 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1901)).
86. See generally William T. Toal, Note, Surface Water in South Carolina, 23 S.C. L. REv.
82 (1971). The common enemy rule was first adopted in Edwards v. Charlotte, C. & A.
Railroad, 39 S.C. 472, 18 S.E. 58 (1893).
87. 238 S.C. 623, 121 S.E.2d 223 (1961).
88. Id. at 633, 121 S.E.2d at 228.
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Efforts to modify or abandon the rule in South Carolina have been unsuccess-
ful. 89
Of interest here, of course, is the nuisance exception to the common
enemy rule. This exception has the potential to swallow the rule if the
downstream landowner is required to show only the presence of a nuisance in
the broad sense of "anything which works hurt, inconvenience, or dam-
age."I ° Indeed, language from several cases implies that the exception
encompasses any kind of nuisance." On the other hand, case law frequently
describes the nuisance exception as involving only a nuisance per se, an
activity which is "dangerous at all times and under all circumstances to life,
health or property."I As only one South Carolina case has found an activity
to be a nuisance per se, 3 the exception to the common enemy rule, if
confined to this kind of nuisance, will make it exceedingly difficult for
landowners to recover for surface water interference.
C. Defendant's Conduct
Does the plaintiff prevail in a private nuisance action merely by showing
interference with the use and enjoyment of the property, or must the plaintiff
also prove that the defendant acted negligently or intentionally? Surprisingly,
this fundamental issue remains unresolved in South Carolina. Other
jurisdictions have approached the problem in at least four ways. These
approaches are examined below, with the final one being recommended for use
in South Carolina.
89. See, e.g., Irwin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 288 S.C. 221, 341 S.E.2d 783 (1986) (refusing
to adopt "New Jersey rule" which imposes liability for decreasing land's absorptive capacity by
installing an artificial drainage system); Williams v. Skipper, 284 S.C. 261, 325 S.E.2d 577 (Ct.
App. 1985) (per curiam) (refusing to overrule the "common enemy" rule and adopt the
"reasonable use" rule).
90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
91. Johnson v. Williams, 238 S.C. at 633, 121 S.E.2d at 228; Johnson v. Phillips, _ S.C.
._ .. 433 S.E.2d 895, 899 (Ct. App. 1993); Glenn v. School Dist. No. Five, 294 S.C. 530,
533, 366 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ct. App. 1988).
92. Baltzeger v. Carolina Midland Ry., 54 S.C. 242, 247, 32 S.E. 358,360 (1899). For other
cases citing this language, see, e.g., Fairey v. Southern Railway, 162 S.C. 129, 133, 160 S.E.
274, 275 (1931); Deason v. Southern Railway, 142 S.C. 328, 333, 140 S.E. 575, 576 (1927).
More recently, the court of appeals described the nuisance per se as "one of the two exceptions
to the common enemy doctrine." Williams v. Skipper, 284 S.C. at 262, 325 S.E.2d at 578; see
also Suddeth v. Knight, 280 S.C. 540, 545, 314 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the
.common enemy" rule is subject to "the general law regarding nuisances" and then applying the
nuisance per se test).
93. Deason, 142 S.C. 328, 140 S.E. 575 (refusing to disturb the jury's finding that the
defendant's activity constituted a nuisanceper se). Relying onDeason, the South Carolina Court
of Appeals in Suddeth, 280 S.C. 540, 314 S.E.2d 11, reversed the trial judge's granting of a
nonsuit in a surface water drainage case.
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1. Negligence Approach
One option is to require the plaintiff to prove the defendant's negligence.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, has held that negligence does
not have to be proven in a nuisance case: "A nuisance is, in itself, a wrongful
act; therefore, it is not necessary to prove negligeence [sic], which is another
wrong, in order to recover damages caused by the nuisance, as negligence is
no part of that cause of action.""' The Fourth Circuit also has held that
under South Carolina law a plaintiff may recover in nuisance "without proof
of negligence. "I
2. Strict Liability Approach
A second approach, which prevailed in the early English cases,9" is to
impose strict liability on the defendant. The creator of a nuisance would be
liable whether or not the interference is caused negligently or intentionally.
The South Carolina appellate courts have not directly addressed this
approach; however, several cases are relevant to the issue. In Frost v.
Berkeley Phosphate Co.,97 involving a nuisance action for damages caused
by emissions from the defendant's fertilizer plant, the trial judge instructed the
jury that the defendant was required to use his property "as not to unlawfully
and unreasonably injure his neighbor's property."98 Relying in part on
Rylands v. Fletcher,99 the supreme court held that this instruction was in
error:
On the contrary, we think if one uses his own land for the prosecution of
some business from which injury to his neighbor would either necessarily
94. Drews v. E.P. Burton & Co., 76 S.C. 362, 366, 57 S.E. 176, 178 (1907) (emphasis in
original).
95. Jacksonv. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 317 F.2d 95, 96 (4th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (citing
e.g., Conestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931)).,
That negligence does not have to be proved in a nuisance case is implicitly recognized by the
legislature in South Carolina's "right to farm" statute. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-45-10 (Law.
Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1993). Section 46-45-30 provides that an agricultural facility that has been
in operation at least a year and was not a nuisance when it began shall not become a nuisance as
the result of changes in land use in the area. This protection, however, does not apply
"whenever a nuisance results from the negligent, improper, or illegal operation of an agricultural
facility or operation." Id. § 46-45-30.
In South Carolina negligence need not be proved in a trespass action. Baldwin v. Postal Tel.
Cable Co., 78 S.C. 419, 422, 59 S.E. 67, 68 (1907).
96. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 87, at 624.
97. 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280 (1894).
98. Id. at 403, 20 S.E. at 281.
99. 19 L.T.R. 220 (H.L. 1868).
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or probably ensue, he is liable if such injury does result, even though he
may have used reasonable care in the prosecution of such business.
100
This statement, of course, is the essential principle of Rylands v. Fletcher. 10,
The English case, however, has fared poorly in South Carolina since the
Frost decision. In Allison v. Ideal Laundry & Cleaners, 11 propane gas
escaped from a tank at the defendant's business, causing a catastrophic
explosion. Describing Rylands v. Fletcher as "generally repudiated" in the
United States,0 3 the supreme court refused to hold the defendant strictly
liable for the negligence of the independent contractor.
Snow v. City of Columbia"M involved water damage to the plaintiffs'
residence as the result of a leaking pipe in the city's water main. It was
undisputed that the city had no knowledge of the leak until after the plaintiffs'
loss. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the city on the negligence
claim but in favor of the plaintiffs on both the strict liability and trespass
causes of action. No nuisance claim was involved in this case.10
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for
amnew trial solely on the negligence cause of action. 06 The court emphati-
cally rejected the plaintiffs' position that the city should be held strictly liable:
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher forms no part of the common law of
South Carolina.
At common law, tort liability has primarily been grounded not on the
notion that the defendant by his mere act or omission has caused harm to
the plaintiff, but rather on the notion that the defendant by his wrongful act
or omission has caused harm to the plaintiff.
... Fault remains a foundational principle of tort liability today.
• . . If fault is not involved, the common law ordinarily leaves the
100. Frost, 42 S.C. at 409, 20 S.E. at 283.
101. 19 L.T.R. 220. For a general discussion of Rylands v. Fletcher and its role in the
development of the doctrine of strict liability, see PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note
3, § 78, at 545-59. For an update on the development of Rylands v. Fletcher in England, see
Andrew Bryce et al., Strict Liability in England for Environmental Pollution, NAT. RESOURCES
& ENv'T, Spring 1993, at 38.
102. 215 S.C. 344, 55 S.E.2d 281 (1949).
103. Id. at 349-50, 55 S.E.2d at 282. The observation, however, is incorrect. "It is still
commonly, and erroneously, said that Rylands v. Fletcher is rejected by the great majority of the
American courts." WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 509 n.98 (4th
ed. 1971).
104. 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, Feb. 4, 1992.
105. Id. at 545, 409 S.E.2d at 798.
106. Id. at 556, 409 S.E.2d at 804.
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shifting of risk to private agreement or statute. 07
The court of appeals, therefore, held that the trial judge erred in not
dismissing the strict liability claim and in not allowing the jury to decide
whether the city was at fault."'8
The court of appeals, however, noted that so-called "ultrahazardous
activities" are among the "few narrowly defined categories" for which strict
liability traditionally has been imposed under the common law. 1  This view
is consistent with the position of the First and Second Restatements, which
limit the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher to "ultrahazardous"110 and "abnormally
dangerous"' activities, respectively.
There are at least four other relevant cases. In Wallace v. A.H. Guion &
Co., 112 the South Carolina Supreme Court adhered to the Restatement rule
in holding that the blasting of dynamite is an ultrahazardous activity because
"'high explosives are used and it is impossible to predict with certainty the
extent or severity of its consequences.'""' In Haofeld v. Atlas Enterprises,
Inc.,114 the court refused to apply the abnormally dangerous activities
doctrine to fireworks manufacturers and distributors. In Ravan v. Greenville
County, the court of appeals indicated that "[w]ere we to adopt the Restateme-
nt's criteria, we would not be inclined to hold the corporate respondents'
activities [of handling hazardous waste] were abnormally dangerous as a matter
of law. However, we leave that determination to our Supreme Court should
it consider further review of this case." 5 The parties in Ravan did not
petition the supreme court to hear the case. Finally, the Fourth Circuit
recently held that South Carolina "currently does not recognize strict liability
for damages caused by hazardous waste disposal or reclamation." 6
Thus, at present, blasting is the only activity that the South Carolina
Supreme Court has declared as ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous. It
remains to be seen if the court will extend the doctrine to other activities. But
even if it does, it is doubtful that many nuisances will be on the list. 117 At
107. Id. at 548-52, 409 S.E.2d at 799-801.
108. Id. at 556, 409 S.E.2d at 804.
109. Snow, 305 S.C. at 549-50, 409 S.E.2d at 800.
110. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
111. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §§ 519-20.
112. 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960).
113. Id. at 354, 117 S.E.2d at 361 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938)).
114. 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980).
115. _ S.C. _, 434 S.E.2d 296, 305 (Ct. App. 1993).
116. Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 996 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (table
dispositon), 1993 WL 241179, at *5. See infra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
117. It should be noted that federal and state trial judges in hazardous waste disposal cases in
South Carolina have permitted juries to determine whether the defendant should be held strictly
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least the kinds of activities that the South Carolina courts have found to be
nuisances-junkyards, funeral homes, barking dogs and truck
terminals' -can hardly be described as ultrahazardous or abnormally
dangerous. Except for Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 9 whose preceden-
tial value is now questionable at best, there is no support in the South Carolina
case law for imposing strict liability on the defendant who engages in these
kinds of "normal" activities.
3. Restatement Approach
A third approach is set forth in section 822 of the Restatement, which
requires a showing that the interference is either "(a) intentional and
unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities.""'0
Two essential elements must be proven under section 822(a): the intent
to interfere, and the unreasonableness of the interference. The Restatement
defines an interference as intentional if the defendant "(a) acts for the purpose
of causing it or (b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result
from his conduct." 1' It is not necessary that the interference "be inspired
by malice or ill will. .... An invasion so inspired is intentional, but so is an
invasion that the actor knowingly causes in the pursuit of a laudable enterprise
without any desire to cause harm."" 2
Where intent is considered an essential element of the cause of action,
nuisance falls outside the scope of the strict liability doctrine. As Prosser and
Keeton explain:
A source of much confusion has resulted from the notion that if liability
is imposed on those who act reasonably in intentionally interfering with
others, then such liability is a kind of liability without fault. It is not;
rather, it is liability for harm caused by an intentional invasion; and it may
be no justification for not paying for the harm caused that the defendant
inflicted the harm reasonably in his own interest or that of the general
public.
12
The Restatement also points out that "when the conduct is continued after
liable. See infra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
118. See cases cited supra notes 4-14.
119. 42 S.C. 402, 20 S.E. 280 (1894).
120. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 822.
121. RmATEMENT, supra note 22, § 825.
122. Id. cmt. c.
123. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 91, at 653.
[Vol. 45:337
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/5
COMMON-LAW NUISANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
the actor knows that the invasion is resulting from it, further invasions are
intentional."' 4 Thus, a company that continues to emit pollutants after it is
notified that they are blowing onto the plaintiffs land is deemed to have
intended that result."z
There is support in the South Carolina case law for the Restatement's
rules on intent. In Snow v. City of Columbia,"6 the court of appeals
addressed the meaning of intent under the law of trespass: "Intent is proved
by showing that the defendant acted voluntarily and that he knew or should
have known the result would follow from his act." 7 The Restatement
definition of intent in nuisance cases is based on the same principle: An
interference is intentional if the defendant "knows that it is resulting or is
substantially certain to result from his conduct."'
In South Carolina, as in most jurisdictions, nuisances do not arise from
a single or isolated act. In holding that an oil spill into a creek did not support
a nuisance claim, the supreme court held: "A nuisance generally involves the
idea of continuity or recurrence, rather than occasional or temporary injury or
annoyance. A single isolated occurrence or act, which if regularly repeated
would constitute a nuisance, is not a nuisance, until it is regularly repeat-
ed." 9 Nuisance cases usually involve continuously occurring conduct. In
these cases, proving the requisite intent to interfere should not be a difficult
124. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 825 cmt. d.
125. See Bradley v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 709 P.2d 782-785-86 (Wash. 1985) (en
bane). It is probably not necessary that the defendant know the identity of the affected
landowners. Id. at 786 (stating that the owner and operator of copper smelter "had to appreciate
with substantial certainty that the law of gravity would visit the effluence upon someone,
somewhere").
126. 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, Feb. 4, 1992.
127. Id. at 553, 409 S.E.2d at 802; see also Jacobson v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 539 P.2d
641, 643 (Or. 1975) (en bane) ("'Intentional,' as used in this context, means that the act was
done with the knowledge that it would result in damage to another, not that it was done for the
purpose of perpetrating injury." (citing e.g., Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 466 P.2d 605 (Or.
1970))).
Both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the defendant
cannot be held liable in a nuisance action unless an "act" is shown. Clemson Univ. v. First
Provident Corp., 260 S.C. 640, 653, 197 S.E.2d 914, 920 (1973) ("There is no evidence in this
case that the respondents did any acts that could be construed as a nuisance."); Home Sales, Inc.
v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 299 S.C. 70, 82, 382 S.E.2d 463, 469 (Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam)
("mo constitute an actionable nuisance, a wrongful act of the defendantmust be shown .... ).
Obviously, a prerequisite to proving intent is evidence that the defendant committed some kind
of affirmative act.
128. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 825(b).
129. Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. 558, 568, 183 S.E.2d 438, 443 (1971)
(citations omitted). But see Crosby v. Southern Ry., 221 S.C. 135, 69 S.E.2d 209 (1952)
(refusing to dismiss nuisance action for damages caused by blocking of access to plaintiff's
property for about twenty four hours).
1994]
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matter. While the initial interference may have been unintended, the conduct
becomes intentional once the defendant is aware of the interference.
The second element that must be proved under section 822(a) is the
unreasonableness of the interference with the use and enjoyment of the
plaintiff's property. Whether the interference is unreasonable depends upon
the results of a balancing test in with the "gravity of the harm" to the plaintiff
is weighed against the "utility of the conduct" of the defendant. In evaluating
the "gravity of the harm," the following factors are important: the extent of
the harm; the character of the harm; the social value that the law attaches to
the type of use or enjoyment invaded; the suitability of the particular use or
enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality; and the burden on the
plaintiff of avoiding the harm. 30
Consideration of the "utility of the conduct" of the defendant involves the
following factors: the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose
of the conduct; the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality;
and the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion."'
In general, the plaintiff will not recover unless he proves that the gravity
of his harm outweighs the utility of the defendant's conduct (and, of course,
that the defendant acted intentionally).' There are, however, five excep-
tions to this general rule.'
There is some support in the South Carolina case law for this kind of
balancing approach. In Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.," the supreme
court referred to several of the Restatement factors in explaining how nuisance
determinations are made:
What is a reasonable use and whether a particular use is a nuisance cannot
be determined by any fixed general rules, but depends upon the facts of
each particular case, such as location, character of the neighborhood,
nature of the use, extent and frequency of the injury, the effect upon the
enjoyment of life, health, and property, and the like. A use of property
in one locality and under some circumstances may be lawful and reason-
130. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 827.
131. Id. § 828.
132. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 826(a).
133. The exceptions are (1) where the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial
burden of 6ompensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the continuation of
the conduct not feasible; (2) the defendant's conduct is for the sole purpose of causing harm to
the plaintiff and is contrary to the common standards of decency; (3) the invasion is severe and
greater than the plaintiff should be required to bear without compensation; (4) the harm is
significant and it would be practicable for the defendant to avoid the harm in whole or in part
without undue hardship; and (5) the harm is significant, and the use or enjoyment interfered with
is well suited to the character of the locality and the defendant's conduct is unsuited to the
locality. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §§ 826(b), 829-31.
134. 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 (1963).
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able, which under other circumstances would be unlawful, unreasonable,
and a nuisance.
135
Similarly, in Young v. Brown, 36 the court stated that "due regard must be
had to the correlative rights of the parties" in determining whether an activity
should be declared a private nuisance. 137 The court of appeals recently cited
this statement with approval in Ravan v. Greenville County.
1 38
Section 822(b) of the Restatement goes on to impose liability for
unintentional interferences that result from negligent, reckless, or abnormally
dangerous conduct. It is difficult to understand what useful purpose is served
by allowing the plaintiff to base a nuisance cause of action on this type of
conduct. The plaintiff, of course, is free to pursue a separate negligence
claim, and, if the facts and jurisdiction permit, a strict liability claim. Indeed,
even in jurisdictions that follow the section 822(b) rule courts have "expressed
reservations about permitting a cause of action that merely reiterates plaintiff's
negligence and strict liability claims."139 In any event, the issue is of little
importance in South Carolina which, as previously discussed, has rejected the
application of negligence principles in nuisance cases and to date has confined
the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine to the blasting of dynamite.
4. The "No Balancing" (and Recommended) Approach.
The Restatement devotes fifteen pages to an explanation of what "gravity
of harm" and "utility of conduct" mean and how they should be considered
and balanced by the fact-finder.Y°0 One emerges from a careful reading of
that explanation with anything but a clear understanding of how the process
works. In jury trials, a judge adhering to the Restatement approach faces a
formidable task indeed of drafting a comprehensible instruction on this subject.
More important, however, it is simply wrong to employ a balancing test
at the liability stage of the proceeding. By imposing upon the plaintiff the
obligation of proving that his harm, however unreasonable or "grave" it may
135. Id. at 160, 130 S.E.2d at 367 (quoting 39 AM. JUR. Nuisances § 16 (1942)).
136. 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 763 (1948).
137. Id. at 169, 46 S.E.2d at 679.
138. _ S.C. _, 434 S.E.2d 296, 307 (Ct. App. 1993).
139. Jersey City Redev. Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (D.N.J. 1987),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Mayor & Council v. Klockner & Klockner,
811 F. Supp. 1039, 1051 (D.N.J. 1993); see also Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co.
of N.Y., Inc., 362 N.E.2d 968, 973 (N.Y. 1977) ("I believe the readiness with which [the
majority] uses the term 'negligence' in the context of this action for nuisance is counterproductive
to the eradication of the confusion which has so long plagued that subject.") (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
140. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §§ 826-28.
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be, outweighs the utility of the defendant's conduct, the Restatement
improperly includes in the inquiry the importance of the defendant's activity
- a matter that should be of no relevance in determining liability in nuisance
cases. 141
An old environmental case illustrates the point. In Madison v. Ducktown
Sulfur, Copper & Iron Co.,142 several farmers brought a nuisance against
two companies engaged in the mining and smelting of copper. The plaintiffs
owned "thin mountain lands" with an aggregate value of only $1,000,143
while the defendants were responsible for over half of the county's tax
revenues and maintained an industry upon which 10-12,000 people were
"practically dependent."'"
The Ducktown court, however, did not employ any type of balancing test
in holding the defendants liable under the common law of nuisance. That test
was reserved for the remedy stage where the court, in effect, held that the
"utility" of the defendants' operations was of such overwhelming importance
to the area that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages, but not injunctive
relief. Thus, "the farmers did not have to establish that their injury out-
weighed the social usefulness of the defendant's activity, but only that an
unreasonable burden had been imposed on them. The balancing applies to
determining the remedy, not the liability. "
14
There is support in the South Carolina case law for this approach. In
Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home,'46 Parker moved his funeral home
from the'town's business district into a residential area whereupon twelve of
his new neighbors promptly filed suit to shut down the operation. Parker
obtained a license from the town to operate his business and did everything
possible to minimize the impact on the residents of the area. The "preparation
room" was concealed, the deceased were delivered at the back of the home
from a secluded side street, and the property was tastefully landscaped. Some
neighborhood children even played with Parker's children in the funeral home
141. The comments candidly admit that "the problem of determining utility in these cases is
fundamentally the same as in negligence cases..." RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §§ 828 cmt.
C.
142. 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1940)
143. Id. at 659, 666.
144. Id. at 660, 661.
145. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY, TEACHERS MANUAL 69 (1992) [hereinafter PLATER]. The same principle is
followed in the well-known case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.
1970). See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. There the court did not apply any kind
of balancing test in finding that the defendant's $45 million cement plant had caused a nuisance
entitling the plaintiffs to a recovery. The nature of that recovery (permanent damages rather than
injunctive relief) was determined by weighing the plaintiffs' interests against the impact of an
injunction on the defendant and the community.
146. 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 (1963).
[Vol. 45:337
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/5
COMMON-LAW NUISANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
yard. 147
The case was referred to a special master who found that the funeral home
was conducted "under modem scientific and sanitary methods, and in an
unostentatious and considerate manner appropriate to the administration of a
dignified and necessary calling. "141 Consequently, the special master
recommended dismissal of the complaint.
The circuit judge rejected the master's report in a lengthy decree which
made it clear that the funeral home's impact on the plaintiffs created a
nuisance: "I do find that with all the consideration that the defendant's
manager has evidenced toward his neighbors, the operation of this undertaking
establishment as now located has materially, tangibly and substantially injured
the plaintiffs in their lawful use of their several properties. "149 To protect
the "greatest of all institutions, the home,"150 the circuit judge issued an
injunction permanently closing down the business.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling in
a 3-2 decision in which every justice expressed an opinion. Chief Justice
Bonham agreed with the circuit judge. Justice Stukes, affirming, found it
significant that no zoning ordinance or "other control" was in effect.'
Acting Justice Oxner emphasized the "particular facts involved" in concurring
with the majority.'52
In his dissenting opinion, acting Associate Justice Lide emphasized the
absence of "the slightest evidence of lack of care on the part of the defen-
dant, " 153 the license that the town issued to Parker, 4 and the wide diver-
gence in the residents' opinions on the funeral home.' Some residents
found the funeral home "exceedingly distasteful," while others testified that
it was a very pleasing sight.'56 Justice Lide strongly objected to the injunc-
tion because there was no evidence of any physical injury to the residents in
the area.1 7 Dissenting Justice Baker expressed his "profound conviction that
this Court by its majority ruling has impinged upon a fundamental right of
property, and has undertaken to do what the legislative authorities of the
municipality in question have with obvious deliberation refrained from
doing. )158
147. Id. at 110-17, 21 S.E.2d at 586-89 (Lide, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 112, 21 S.E.2d at 587.
149. Id. at 92, 21 S.E.2d at 579.
150. Id. at 96, 21 S.E.2d at 581.
151. Fraser, 201 S.C. at 107, 21 S.E.2d at 585 (Stukes, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 108-09, 21 S.E.2d at 585 (Oxner, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 119, 21 S.E.2d at 590.
154. Id. at 116, 21 S.E.2d at 589.
155. Id. at 114-17, 21 S.E.2d at 588-89.
156. Fraser, 201 S.C. at 116, 21 S.E.2d at 588-89.
157. Id. at 124, 21 S.E.2d at 592.
158. Id. at 129-30, 21 S.E.2d at 594-95. In Young v. Brown, a unanimous supreme court
19941
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Whatever one may think of the Fraser court's remedy of shutting down
the defendant's business, the court's analysis in determining the defendant's
liability is consistent with the "no balancing" approach. The critical issue is
whether the interference is unreasonable, not whether the defendant's conduct
is reasonable or has "utility." Thus, although the defendant's conduct in
operating the funeral home was exemplary, the interference was determined
to be unreasonable in light of the facts of the particular case - a determination
typically made by the fact-finder. Moreover, the defendant's intent to interfere
was clear because he knew of, and took steps to alleviate, the impact the
business would have on his neighbors.
Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.'59 involved a private nuisance action
against the owner and operator of a grocery store. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed the trial court's denial of
both its motion for judgment non obstante verdicto (j.n.o v.) and its motion for
a new trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case for a new
trial because of errors in certain evidentiary rulings."t ° The court's discus-
sion of the trial judge's denial of the motion for j.n.o.v. is of interest here.
The court focused on "the normal and necessary incidents" to the operation
of a business, holding that such incidents "cannot be condemned as a nui-
sance."16 The trial court, therefore, had ruled correctly because "[tihe
record gives rise to a reasonable inference that such acts were not normal or
necessary incidents of the operation of the business."162
The court missed the mark: The proper inquiry was not whether the
defendant operated its business in a normal or necessary manner, but whether
the interference caused by the operation was unreasonable. A business can be
operated normally and yet still create a nuisance by causing unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of a plaintiff's property. This
principle is recognized by the Fraser majority, but overlooked by the Winget
court. 163
refused to overturn Fraser, stating: "After mature consideration, we are still of the opinion that
this case was properly decided." 212 S.C. 156, 166, 46 S.E.2d 673, 677 (1948). In Young the
court sustained the overruling of a demurrer to a complaint involving the planned construction
of a cemetery near the plaintiffs residences. Id. at 172, 46 S.E.2d at 680; cf. DeBorde v. St.
Michael & All Angels Episcopal Church, 272 S.C. 490, 252 S.E.2d 876 (1979) (per curiam)
(holding that a cemetery in a large wooded lot that was not visible to surrounding landowners did
not constitute a private nuisance).
159. 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 (1963).
160. Id. at 165, 130 S.E.2d at 370.
161. Id. at 160, 130 S.E.2d at 367.
162. Id. at 162, 130 S.E.2d at 368.
163. The South Carolina Supreme Court also recognized this principle when it reversed a trial
court's dismissal of a complaint, holding that "the normal, nonnegligent operation of the
supermarket" may constitute a private nuisance. Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 235 S.C.
552, 556, 112 S.E.2d 646, 647 (1960); accord, Knoff v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380
360, [Vol. 45:337
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In conclusion, liability determinations in nuisance cases in South Carolina
(and elsewhere) should be fairly simple and straightforward:
(1) Has there been unreasonable"e interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of the plaintiff's property?
(2) Was the defendant's conduct the legal cause of that interference?
(3) Did the defendant intend to cause the interference?
Assuming the absence or inefficacy of any special defense, an affirmative
answer to each of these questions should mean a finding of liability against the
defendant. The importance or utility of the defendant's activity should not be
a relevant consideration in the determination of liability in nuisance cases. As
discussed below, however, that should be a relevant factor in determining the
appropriate remedy. 6
V. DEFENSES
The defendant's filing of the customary "general denial" answer to a
nuisance complaint will have the effect of denying (1) that there has been any
interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's property, (2) that the
interference is substantial, (3) that the interference is intentional and
unreasonable, (4) that the interference was proximately caused by the
defendant, and (5) that the interference has caused any damage. In addition,
the defendant may assert one or more affirmative or special defenses, several
of which are discussed below.
A. Coming to the Nuisance
The defense of "coming to the nuisance" is typically asserted in situations
in which the plaintiff's property was acquired at the time the nuisance was
fully established. It is similar to assumption of the risk, the doctrine that bars
recovery by a plaintiff who freely and voluntarily confronts a known risk with
full awareness of the consequences."
N.W.2d 313, 317 (N.D. 1986) ("Proof of absence of negligence is not a defense to an action
grounded in nuisance, because the focus is upon the condition created and not upon the exercise
of care or skill by the defendant.... ."); Weida v. Ferry, 493 A.2d 824, 826 (R.I. 1985) ("Over
a half century ago it was emphasized that nuisance liability is distinguished from negligence
liability because a nuisance claim is predicated upon an unreasonable injury rather than
unreasonable conduct." (citing Braun v. Iannotti, 175 A. 656 (R.I. 1934))).
164. In South Carolina, "unreasonable" is synonymous with "material" or "great." See supra
notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 250-85 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., King v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 278 S.C. 350, 354, 296 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1982)
(explaining that the respondent only assumed the risk "if she had freely and voluntarily exposed
herself to a known danger of which she understood and appreciated the danger") (emphasis in
original) (citing e.g., Canady v. Martschink Beer Distribs., 255 S.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 475
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Most courts do not hold, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff who "comes
to the nuisance" is barred from asserting a nuisance claim. As Prosser
summarizes the majority view: "[T]he purchaser is entitled to the reasonable
use and enjoyment of his land to the same extent as any other owner, so long
as he buys in good faith and not for the sole purpose of a vexatious law-
suit."" The purchaser, however, may have difficulty recovering damages
because the purchase price of the property presumably reflected the adjoining
nuisance. In one remarkable case, a real estate developer acquired property
near the defendant's cattle feedlot operation and sued to enjoin the nui-
sance.' 68 The court agreed that a permanent injunction was appropriate, but
ordered the developer, having brought residents to the nuisance, to compensate
the defendant for the costs of relocating or shutting down his business.'69
There is little discussion of the coming to the nuisance defense in any
reported decision in South Carolina. Two conflicting statements of dictum
appear in the case law. In Young v. Brown, 170 the court stated that "one is
not in a position to complain who builds or buys a home near a cemetery
already established. "171 But in another case, the court expressed disapproval
of the defense:
As a rule, it is no justification for maintaining a nuisance that a party
complaining of it came voluntarily within its reach. Thus, according to the
weight of authority, the fact that a person voluntarily comes to a nuisance
by moving into the sphere of its injurious effects, or by purchasing
adjoining property or erecting a residence or building in the vicinity after
the nuisance is created, does not prevent him from recovering damages for
injuries sustained therefrom, or deprive him of the right to enjoin its
maintenance, especially where, by reason of changes in the structure or
business complained of, the annoyance has been since increased. 72
Most jurisdictions are unwilling to deny a day in court to the plaintiff who
comes to the nuisance.. However, when the plaintiff appeared on the scene is
a relevant consideration at both the liability and remedy stages of the nuisance
case. 173
(1970)).
167. PROSSER, supra note 103, § 91, at 611 (footnotes omitted).
168. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (en bane).
169. Id. at 708.
170. 212 S.C. 156, 46 S.E.2d 673 (1948).
171. Id. at 171, 46 S.E.2d at 680.
172. Carter v. Lake City Baseball Club, Inc., 218 S.C. 255, 272, 62 S.E.2d 470,478 (1950)
(quoting 39 Am. JUR. Nuisances § 197 (1942)); cf. Henry v. Southern Ry., 93 S.C. 125, 75 S.E.
1018 (1912) (stating that plaintiff was on notice of defendant's dam and associated right to flood
pasture rented by plaintiff, and, therefore, plaintiff would have a claim only for defendant's
negligent operation of dam).
173. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 840D; John D. Ingram, Coming to the Nuisance:
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B. Contributory Negligence
Because the supreme court has held that negligence does not have to be
proved in a nuisance case, contributory negligence would not be a proper
defense. 74
C. Regulatory Compliance (and Noncompliance)
Nuisance litigation often involves a defendant who possesses one or more
governmental licenses or permits. Examples include a local permit to build
a structure and a federal or state permit to discharge pollutants. In a nuisance
suit, how important is it that the government permitted the activity or
discharge in question? How does it affect the suit if the plaintiff shows that
the defendant has violated the terms of a permit or license?
In South Carolina, a license or permit to construct or operate a business
affords no immunity against a nuisance action.175 In Neal v. Darby,176 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals held that the trial judge was required to give
only sufficient weight to the defendant's state and federal permits; 17 7 these
permits did not preclude a determination that a hazardous waste landfill located
in close proximity to a tributary of the area's water supply constituted a public
nuisance. 
178
Nor Shall Private Property Be Taken Without.... 5 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 181 (1985); Ferdinand
S. Tinio, Annotation, "Coming to Nuisance"as a Defense or Estoppel, 42 A.L.R.3D 344 (1972).
174. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Contra RESTATEMENT, supra note 22,
§ 840B (recognizing contributory negligence as a proper defense to a nuisance suit when the
nuisance is alleged to result from the defendant's negligent conduct).
While there is no South Carolina case on point, courts in other jurisdictions have not been
receptive to efforts by plaintiffs to avoid the contributory negligence defense by couching what
is essentially a negligence claim under the nuisance doctrine. As one court held:
Merely attaching the label 'nuisance' to an action for personal injuries does not alter
the nature of the action. Where the acts or omissions constituting negligence are the
identical acts which it is asserted give rise to a cause of action for nuisance, the rules
applicable to negligence will be applied.
Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 103 N.W.2d 131, 135 (Minn. 1960) (citing Jablon v. City of
New York, 31 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1941)).
175. See, e.g., Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 242 S.C. 152, 158, 130 S.E.2d 363, 366
(1963) (citing e.g., 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 17(c) (1950)); Ryan v. Copes, 45 S.C.L. (11 Rich.)
217, 238 (1858) (stating that a city license is "entitled to higher estimation than the opinions of
private individuals" when determining whether the defendant's actions are a nuisance). Most
jurisdictions follow the rule that compliance with a governmental permit is not a complete defense
to a nuisance action. See, e.g., Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Massengill, 338 S.E.2d 428 (Ga.
1986).
176. 282 S.C. 277, 318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984).
177. Id. at 285, 318 S.E.2d at 23.
178. Id. at 286, 318 S.E.2d at 24.
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Government permits can be two-edged swords, and plaintiffs will make
every effort to introduce into evidence a defendant's failure to comply with an
applicable law or regulation. In negligence cases, such evidence is admissible
and constitutes negligence per se,179 leaving the plaintiff with the burden of
proving only causation and damages.
Should evidence of noncompliance have a similarly conclusive effect in
nuisance litigation? Professor Rodgers writes that "[t]he violation of a permit
or effluent standard generally is per se evidence of unreasonable operation for
purposes of nuisance law."180 This view, however, is inconsistent with the
basic tenet of the doctrine which, as discussed previously, focuses on whether
the interference is unreasonable, not on whether the defendant acted unreason-
ably. '81 Thus, noncompliance with a permit should not mean that the
defendant's activity is a nuisance per se.'"
179. See, e.g., Reed v. Clark, 277 S.C. 310, 317, 286 S.E.2d 384, 388 (1982) (citation
omitted) ("It is well-settled that causative violation of an applicable statute constitutes actionable
negligenceand is evidence of recklessness, willfulness and wantonness."). However, the plaintiff
must show the following to prove that the defendant owed a duty of care based on a statute: "(1)
That the essential purpose of the statute is to protect from the kind of harm the plaintiff has
suffered; and (2) that he is a member of the class of persons the statute is intended to protect."
Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 297 S.C. 95, 103, 374 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ct.
App. 1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379 S.E.2d 133 (1989).
180. 1 RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.11, at 99 (footnote omitted).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 120-65.
182. The South Carolina Pollution Control Act contains a puzzling provision that raises some
question as to whether regulatory violations can even be admitted into evidence in common law
suits. Section 48-1-250 provides:
Causes of action resulting from the violation of the prohibitions contained in this
chapter inure to and are for the benefit of any person or persons damaged as the
result of any such violation. A determination by the Department that pollution exists
or a violation of any of the prohibitions contained in this chapter, whether or not
actionable by the State, create no presumption of law or fact inuring to or for the
benefit of persons other than the State.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-250 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
This provisiondoes not representthe General Assembly's finesthour of legislative drafting.
What the first sentence grants - claims based on violations of the Act are for the benefit of
persons damaged thereby, the second sentence seems to take away - violations of the Act do not
inure to the benefit of anyone except the State. No legislative history or reported decision sheds
any light on the section's meaning.
There is an unreported federal court decision in South Carolina which discusses § 48-1-250.
In Davis v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Co., Civil Action No. 80-784-3 (D.S.C. 1982), the
plaintiffs complained that fluoride emissions from the defendant's plant constituted a nuisance
entitling them to damages and injunctive relief. There was evidence that emissions from the plant
frequently violated the South Carolina gaseous fluoride standard. The court, sitting without a
jury, held that the plaintiffs failed to prove any causal connection between the plant's emissions
and their damages. In dictum, the court addressed § 48-1-250:
mhe fact that the defendant may have violated air quality standards established by
the State of South Carolina "creates no presumption of law or fact inuring to or for
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D. Statute of Limitations
Nuisances, like other torts in South Carolina, are subject to the state's
basic three-year statute of limitations." Little case law on the application
of the statute of limitations to nuisance claims exists. In inverse condemnation
cases, however, the principle is well settled in South Carolina that when the
taldng is temporary or abatable, "there arises a continuing cause of action, and
while limitations begin to run at the occurrence of the first actual damage, the
landowner may at any time recover for injury to his land which occurred
within the statutory period."184 There is no reason to believe that the rule
is any different in private nuisance cases involving temporary or abatable
nuisances. 115
Most nuisances can be abated by installing technological controls on the
offending activity. In these cases, the plaintiff's cause of action should be a
continuing one." 6
the benefit of persons other than the state." Section 48-1-250, South Carolina Code
of Laws (1976). Proof that the defendant has not always been completely in
compliance with fluoride standards established by the State of South Carolina does
not, in and of itself, entitle the plaintiffs to relief in this action.
Order dated January 20, 1982 at 8. The court did not consider the first sentence of § 48-1-250.
As previously noted, it is well settled that the violation of an applicable law or regulation
constitutes negligence per se. It is hard to believe that the General Assembly, through the
ambiguously written § 48-1-250, intended to abandon this principle in a field as important as
environmental protection. It may be that the section's second sentence reflects a concern about
the prejudicial impact of an administrative agency's determination that a regulatory violation has
occurred. Admitting into evidence the agency's notice of violation, administrative order, or
penalty assessment arguably would be as prejudicial to the defendant as allowing investigating
police officers in automobile accident cases to testify that they issued a ticket to one of the
parties; in the latter case, such testimony is not allowed. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-6160 (Law.
Co-op. 1991). The second sentence may be saying, albeit unartfully, that this kind of testimony
will not be admitted in environmental cases. While the regulatory standard, like the speed limit,
and monitoring results, like eye-witness testimony about speed, are admissible, it is for the jury
to decide whether a violation actually occurred, and the agency's determination in that regard
would not be admissible.
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
184. McCurley v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 256 S.C. 332, 335, 182 S.E.2d 299,
300 (1971) (quoting Hilton v. Duke Power Co., 254 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1958)); accord
Conestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931); Glenn v. School Dist.
No. Five, 294 S.C. 530, 366 S.E.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1988).
185. See Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run as
to Cause of Action for Nuisance Based on Air Pollution, 19 A.L.R.4TH 456, 460 (1983) (noting
general agreement among the courts that where the nuisance is abatable by reasonable means, "a
nuisance action can be brought for damages at least for those injuries incurred within the
applicable limitations period regardless of when the nuisance began").
186. The perpetrator of an abatable nuisance might be able to obtain a prescriptive right to
maintain the nuisance, although no South Carolina cases have so held. The statutory period for
obtaining a prescriptive right is ten years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-67-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
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E. Lack of Control
A defendant may be able to avoid liability by showing that he did not
have possession or control of the property or instrumentality allegedly
responsible for the nuisance. In Clark v. Greenville County,' the plaintiffs
sought the recovery of property damage for groundwater contamination
allegedly caused by an old county landfill. The defendants included Greenville
County, four companies that generated waste disposed of at the landfill, and
a company that transported waste to the site.
The trial court granted the summary judgment motion of the corporate
defendants on the nuisance claim, ruling:
Plaintiffs failed to prove essential elements of their nuisance cause of
action. First, the claimed conditions on plaintiffs' properties were not
caused by activities of the corporate defendants as a neighbor, because the
corporate defendants never owned, designed, constructed, operated,
maintained or closed the landfill. Second, plaintiffs did not demonstrate
a contemporaneous interference with their property rights by the corporate
defendants, because the corporate defendants did not use the landfill during
the time plaintiffs owned their properties.
188
Describing the "historical purpose" of the private nuisance cause of action as
that of "protecting neighboring landowners,"'8 9 the trial court refused to
extend the doctrine beyond that purpose.
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that "one
who has no control over property at the time of the alleged nuisance cannot
be held liable therefor."19 Because there was no evidence that "the corpo-
rate respondents had control over the landfill or the hazardous waste once it
was deposited at the landfill," the lower court "correctly ruled the corporate
respondents could not be liable for nuisance because they had no control over
the property allegedly used as a nuisance."' 9' The supreme court did not
address the second ground for the trial judge's ruling (that the respondents did
not use the landfill at the time the plaintiffs owned their property).
The decision has important implications for nuisance cases involving
waste disposal sites. Waste generators and transporters involved in common
law suits in South Carolina should not hesitate to seek dismissal of the
cf. Jordan v. Lang, 22 S.C. 159 (1885) (finding the defendant had a prescriptive right to irrigate
because he used water in violation of plaintiff's riparian rights for twenty years).
187. __ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 117 (1993).
188. Order dated March 20, 1992, at 5, Clark (90-CP-23-4683).
189. Id.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [1994], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss2/5
COMMON-LAW NUISANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
nuisance claim based on Clark. If the claim is to survive, the plaintiff will
have to offer evidence that the defendant retained some degree of control over
the waste after it left his possession. One possible theory is Section 427B of
the Restatement, which provides that liability can be imposed on a person who
retains an independent contractor to perform work likely to create a nuisance
or trespass. 1 2 This theory was not involved in Clark, but in a federal suit
in South Carolina, the court submitted to the jury the question of whether a
generator of waste products delivered to an off-site chemical reclamation
facility was liable under the theory of Section 427B for soil and groundwater
contamination caused by operations at the facility.193
F. Sovereign Immunity and Inverse Condemnation
In McCall v. Batson, "9 the South Carolina Supreme Court abolished the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in South Carolina for torts committed by state
and local governments." 5 Galvanized into the action, the General Assembly
enacted the South Carolina Tort Claims Act'96 the following year. The Act
declares that "total immunity from liability on the part of the government is
not desirable,"" 9 but provides that "neither should the government be
subject to unlimited nor unqualified liability for its actions."' The Act
limits the amount of damages that may be recovered' and provides thirty-
one specific exceptions to the waiver of immunity.'
192. REsTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 427B.
193. Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 793 F. Supp. 670 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 996 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Another defendant in the suit was the former owner and operator of the reclamation facility
who sold the contaminated site to another party in 1977. This defendant's nuisance liability, too,
was determined by the jury. Allowing that claim to go to the jury is consistent with Section
840A of the Restatement which provides that a vendor of land upon which a nuisance exists "for
which he would be subject to liability if he continued in possession remains subject to liability
for the continuation of the nuisance after he transfers the land." RESTATEMENT, supra note 22,
§ 840A. Clark would not appear to change that result since the former owner had "control over
the property allegedly used as a nuisance." __ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 119.
The court also submitted to the jury the question of whether the present owner of the
contaminated site was liable in nuisance. That result also appears unaffected by Clark because
the present owner does have control over the source of the contamination. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 22, § 839 cmt. d (stating that possessor of land may be liable for failure to abate
nuisance even though possessor had no part in its creation).
194. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
195. Id. at 244, 329 S.E.2d at 741.
196. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-10 to -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
197. Id. § 15-78-20(a).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 15-78-120.
200. Id. § 15-78-60.
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The seventh exception states: "The governmental entity is not liable for
a loss resulting from . . a nuisance." 1 Thus, state and local governments
continue to be immune from common law nuisance actions. Despite this
immunity, the government remains subject to liability under the constitutional
doctrine of inverse condemnation. The proscription against taking private
property for public purposes without just compensation found in article I,
section 13 of the South Carolina Constitution has been the focal point of
scores of suits against the nuisance-like activities of governmental bodies.
To establish a claim for inverse condemnation, the plaintiff must
demonstrate four elements: "(1) an affirmative, positive, aggressive act on the
part of the governmental agency; (2) a taking; (3) the taking is for a public
use; and (4) the taking has some degree of permanence. "23
The principle underlying the first element is that "it is difficult, if not
impossible, to take anything from someone negatively or by failing to
act. "I Thus, overloaded or clogged sewer lines, 5 a broken water
main,206 an improperly designed school building,2' an inadequate drainage
system,208 and the denial of a building permit2 9 do not involve "affirma-
tive, positive, [and] aggressive " 21 acts that subject the government to
liability for a taking of private property. On the other hand, raising the level
of a public street, 21  removing sidewalks and building supports,212 pulling
loose a gas line, 13 diverting groundwater,2 4 and preventing a landowner
201. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(7).
202. S.C. CONST. art. I § 13 ("Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, private
property shall not be taken . . . for public use without just compensation b6ing first made
therefor.").
203. Rolandi v. City of Spartanburg, 294 S.C. 161, 164, 363 S.E.2d 385, 387 (Ct. App.
1987) (citing Berry's on Main, Inc. v. City of Columbia, 277 S.C. 14, 281 S.E.2d 796 (1981)).
204. Brown v. School Dist., 251 S.C. 220, 225, 161 S.E.2d 815, 817 (1968).
205. See Collins v. City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958), overruled on
other grounds by Berry's on Main, Inc., 277 S.C. 14, 281 S.E.2d 796; Rolandi, 294 S.C. 161,
363 S.E.2d 385.
206. See Belue v. City of Spartanburg, 276 S.C. 381, 280 S.E.2d 49 (1981), overruled on
other grounds by McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
207. See Brown, 251 S.C. 220, 161 S.E.2d 815.
208. See McGann v. Mungo, 287 S.C. 561, 340 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986).
209. See Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940), overruled on other
grounds by McCall, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741.
210. Rolandi v. City of Spartanburg, 294 S.C. 161, 164, 363 S.E.2d 385, 387 (Ct. App.
1987).
211. Newsome v. Town of Surfside Beach, 300 S.C. 14, 386 S.E.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1989).
212. Berry's on Main, Inc. v. City of Columbia, 277 S.C. 14, 281 S.E.2d 796 (1981).
213. Kline v. City of Columbia, 249 S.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 597 (1967).
214. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Balcome, 289 S.C. 243, 345
S.E.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1986).
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from filling her land basin215 have been held sufficiently positive and
aggressive to satisfy the first element of liability.
The second element, proof of a "taking," has been construed broadly by
the supreme court. It is unnecessary to show an actual physical invasion of
property,216 for any damage will be deemed the equivalent of a taking:
"South Carolina has taken the broadest possible view of 'what is a taking' and
has construed the least actual 'damage' to be a 'taking' as distinguished from
the Federal rule, and that of many states, in making a distinction between
'taking' and 'damaging'."217 This principle is expressed repeatedly in the
case law.218 Therefore, any nuisance should satisfy the "taking" require-
ment.
As to the requirement that the taking be for a "public use," the court has
observed that "[t]he meaning of the term[] is flexible, and is not confined to
what may constitute a public use at any given time."219 Indeed, the term
public use has proved so flexible that it is difficult to reconcile some of the
cases. In one case, the court held that "[p]ublic benefit and public use are not
synonymous in the better and more clearly constitutional view."I The
court later relied on this point in holding that damage to property caused by
the government's unclogging of a sewer line did not involve a taking for a
public use." Yet in another, more recent case, the court clearly equates
public benefit with public use: "As long as the use is of benefit, utility or
advantage to the public, the use is a public one within the meaning of the law
of eminent domain.'
215. Hill v. City of Hanahan, 281 S.C. 527, 316 S.E.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1984).
216. Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 492, 157 S.E. 842,
846 (1931) ("There may be a taking of property in the constitutional sense although there has
been no actual entry within its bounds and no artificial structure has been erected upon it.")
(citing 10 R.C.L. Eminent Domain § 61 (1929)), overruled on other grounds by McCall v.
Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
217. Webb v. Greenwood County, 229 S.C. 267, 278, 92 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1956).
218. See, e.g., Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1206
(4th Cir. 1986); Spradley v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 256 S.C. 431, 434, 182
S.E.2d 735, 737 (1971); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Wilson, 254 S.C. 360, 366, 175
S.E.2d 391, 395 (1970); Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 21, 8 S.E.2d 871, 873
(1940), overruled on other grounds by McCall, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741; Milhous v. State
Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 39, 8 S.E.2d 852, 854-55 (1940); Balcome, 289 S.C. at 246, 345
S.E.2d at 765.
219. Gasque, 194 S.C. at 23, 8 S.E.2d at 874.
220. Bookhart v. Central Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 219 S.C. 414, 431, 65 S.E.2d 781, 788
(1951) (per curiam).
221. Collins v. City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 512, 105 S.E.2d 704, 708 (1958), overruled
on other grounds by Berry's on Main, Inc. v. City of Columbia, 277 S.C. 14, 281 S.E.2d 796
(1981).
222. Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 393, 175 S.E.2d 805,
812 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
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If the government is using its own property in such a way that neighbor-
ing property is damaged, the plaintiff can satisfy the public use requirement.
For example, in Lindsey v. City of Greenville,' where the release of dam
water destroyed the plaintiff's crop, the court rejected the city's argument that
this destruction was not a taking for a public use, stating: "It is conceded that
the construction, operation and maintenance of the dam and reservoir by the
defendant was a public use. The damages sustained by the plaintiff resulted
from the operation of such project. Under these circumstances, the damages
sustained by plaintiff constituted a taking for public use."224
The Lindsey court also addressed the final element of the inverse
condemnation claim-the requirement that the taking have "some degree of
permanence. "225 The court found that this requirement was satisfied simply
because "[i]t is reasonably inferable that in the normal operation of defendant's
project such discharge of waters from its reservoir will be repeated in the
future."26 The plaintiff thus was confronted with "a situation basically
permanent in nature."'2 In Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer
Authority,22 8 the Fourth Circuit relied on Lindsey in rejecting the defendant's
argument that the planned closing of a sewage plant resulted in only a
temporary taking of the plaintiffs' downstream properties.229
VI. REMEDIES
Three basic remedies are potentially available to the plaintiff who
successfully establishes the defendant's liability in a nuisance case: actual
damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. Each is discussed below.
A. Actual Damages
A critical factor in determining the type of actual damages recoverable by
a successful plaintiff is whether the nuisance is temporary or permanent. The
basic principle is that for a permanent nuisance, the standard is "the difference
between the value of the land before the injury and its value after the
injury,"" whereas for a temporary nuisance, the plaintiff "can recover the
223. 247 S.C. 232, 146 S.E.2d 863 (1966).
224. Id. at 239, 146 S.E.2d at 867.
225. See supra text accompanying note 203.
226. Lindsey, 246 S.C. at 238, 146 S.E.2d at 867.
227. Id. at 238, 146 S.E.2d at 866.
228. 784 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1986).
229. Id. at 1207-08.
230. Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc., 256 S.C. 558, 569, 183 S.E.2d 438, 443 (1971); see
also Ravan v. Greenville County, __ S.C. _, _, 434 S.E.2d 296, 307 (Ct. App. 1993) ("The
measure of damages for permanent injury to real property by pollution, whether by nuisance,
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depreciation in the rental or usable value of the property caused by the
pollution."I'
The South Carolina appellate courts have not yet had to grapple with the
"tricky" and "treacherous" distinction between a permanent and a temporary
nuisance."3 The general rule followed by most jurisdictions is that a
nuisance will be deemed permanent if it is likely to continue indefinitely in the
future. 33 Support for this rule in South Carolina can be found in inverse
condemnation cases where courts have found a permanent taking if it is
reasonable to believe that the government's activity will be repeated in the
future. 4
In some cases, the plaintiff may seek to recover damages based on the
cost of restoring or cleaning up the property. The courts are divided on the
issue of whether the cost of restoration is recoverable if it exceeds the
property's fair market value. 35 The issue is particularly important in
groundwater contamination cases where the cost of remediation can far exceed
the value of the property. The Restatement supports the recovery of the cost
of restoring the property to its original condition unless the cost would be
"disproportionate to the diminution in the value of the land."26 However,
if the property is used "for a purpose personal to the owner," the Restatement
allows recovery of that cost even if it is disproportionate. 37 There is no
reported South Carolina case addressing this question.
The plaintiff in a nuisance action is entitled to recover not only for the
trespass, negligence, or inverse condemnation is the diminution in the market value of the
property." (footnote omitted)).
231. Gray, 256 S.C. at 561, 183 S.E.2d at 443.
232. See 1 RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 109-10.
233. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 930(1); William B. Johnson, Annotation, Measure
and Elements of Damages for Pollution of Well or Spring, 76 A.L.R.4TH 629, 634 (1990). For
statute of limitations purposes, "temporary" and 'permanent" have entirely different meanings.
See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
235. Compare G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379 (Alaska
1974) (allowing remediation costs even though greatly in excess of property's value) with
Newsome v. Billups, 671 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (denying remediation costs because
they exceeded property's value).
236. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 929 cmt. b.
237. Id. In Board of County Comm'rs v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309 (Colo. 1986) (en banc), the
Colorado Supreme Court held:
If the damage is reparable, and the costs, although greater than original value, are not
wholly unreasonable in relation to that value, and if the evidence demonstrates that
payment of market value likely will not adequately compensate the property owner
for some personal or other special reason, we conclude that the selection of the cost
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harm to his proprietary interest but also for any special damages, such as
"damages for loss of peace of mind, unhappiness, annoyance, and deprivation
of enjoyment of property, livestock and crop losses, injury to cattle and
decreases in milk production, damages to domestic animals, plants, clothes on
the line and paint on the house, and a variety of other out-of-pocket expens-
es."238 Recovery of lost profits, too, has been allowed.239 In any event,
where the plaintiff establishes the existence of a nuisance, he is entitled to at
least nominal damages.24
B. Punitive Damages
In nuisance suits, punitive damages are recoverable where the defendant
has acted recklessly, willfully, wantonly or maliciously.
241
C. Injunctive Relief
No nuisance is "permanent" because "any nuisance man creates, man can
abate."242 The polluting factory can be equipped with a scrubber, the noisy
trucks can be routed another way, or the volume can be turned down. Even
in the cases where location, rather than operation, makes the defendant's
activity a nuisance, as in Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home,243 the
nuisance can be abated by shutting down the business.
In nuisance actions, the "better approach" is to allow the plaintiff to elect
between treating the nuisance as permanent (and recovering past and future
damages) or as temporary (and recovering past damages only) .24  But the
238. 1 RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).
239. id. § 2.13, at 112-13; see also Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 294 (N.J.
1987) (upholding "quality of life" award of damages as "derived from the law of nuisance").
240. See Johnson v. Phillips, _ S.C. _ , 433 S.E.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1993).
241. See Sample v. Gulf Ref. Co., 183 S.C. 399, 191 S.E. 209 (1937); see also Jackson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 317 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (punitive damages warranted
where oil deposits continued despite plaintiff's repeated complaints); Touchberry v. Northwestern
R.R., 88 S.C. 47, 70 S.E. 424 (1911) (finding that jury award of punitive damages was proper
when defendant was informed that its railroad track had caused flooding of plaintiff's lands, but
took no steps to correct problem).
242. Moy v. Bell, 416 A.2d 289, 294 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980).
243. 201 S.C. 88, 92, 21 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1942).
244. 1 RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 109; see Cox v. Cambridge Square Towne Houses,
Inc., 236 S.E.2d 73, 75 (Ga. 1977) (giving plaintiff "the right to elect to treat the nuisance as
temporary and sue for all those damages which have occurred within the past four years, or...
may elect to sue for all future damages as well and put an end to the matter"); cf. Mason v.
Apalache Mills, 81 S.C. 554, 561, 62 S.E. 399, 402 (1908) ("But, obviously, when [plaintiff]
elects to take damages for the anticipated future trespass, he cannot have compensation by the
recovery of damages, and at the same time an injunction to restrain the trespass.").
In Cauthen v. Lancaster Cotton Oil Mills, 96 S.C. 342, 80 S.E. 615 (1914), the court held
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plaintiff cannot have it both ways: "[P]laintiffs cannot secure both a damages
judgment for reduced market value due to permanent injury to property and
an injunction abating the cause of the depreciation."245
The plaintiff who elects to treat the nuisance as temporary usually must
convince both judge and jury. In general, the court will not consider the
equitable issues of injunctive relief unless and until the jury resolves the legal
issues in the plaintiffs favor.246 A plaintiff who convinces the jury that a
nuisance exists and receives an award of damages for injuries as of the trial
date will not be made whole unless the court issues an injunction ordering the
defendant to end the nuisance promptly.
Is the successful plaintiff automatically entitled to injunctive relief?. Or
does the court have the discretion to employ the so-called "balancing of
conveniences test" whereby the benefits to the plaintiff of injunctive relief are
weighed against the costs to the defendant of being subjected to an injunction?
In the renowned case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,247 the Court
of Appeals of New York struggled with these questions and concluded that the
defendant's $45 million plant with 300 employees constituted a nuisance that
could avoid being shut down by paying the plaintiffs damages for their total
loss, present and future (which the trial judge had determined to be $185,-
000).248 Judge Jasen lodged a strong dissent:
I see grave dangers in overruling our long-established rule of granting
an injunction where a nuisance results in substantial continuing damage.
In permitting the injunction to become inoperative upon the payment of
permanent damages, the majority is, in effect, licensing a continuing
wrong. It is the same as saying to the cement company, you may continue
that a plaintiff seeking an injunction may introduce evidence on the issue of damages only up to
the date the complaint was filed. Id. at 344-45, 80 S.E. at 616. This rule seems unfair today
when crowded court dockets mean that considerable time elapses between the commencement of
a suit and the actual trial.
245. 1 RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 108 (footnote omitted).
246. See Kennerty v. Etiwan Phosphate Co., 17 S.C. 411, 417 (1882) ("[Ihe general rule
undoubtedly is that equity will not grant an injunction until the legal rights of the parties are
determined and the fact that a nuisance exists is established in a law court, which is the proper
tribunal to decide such questions and measure the damages."); cf. Standard Warehouse Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 222 S.C. 93, 103, 71 S.E.2d 893, 895 (1952) ("Where a case
contains both legal and equity issues, it is discretionary with the trial judge as to which shall be
tried first, and ordinarily that one is tried first which is more likely to aid in deciding the entire
controversy. In the present case, it seems clear that the logical course would be to try the legal
question first, since if the facts do not show the existence of a nuisance and warrant a verdict for
damages in favor of the plaintiff, it would not be entitled to an injunction in equity.").
The plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages in a nuisance case. E.g.,
Baughman v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 298 S.C. 127, 378 S.E.2d 599 (1989).
247. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
248. Id. at 875.
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to do harm to your neighbors so long as you pay a fee for it. Further-
more, once such permanent damages are assessed and paid, the incentive
to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated, thereby continuing air pollution
of an area without abatement. 249
In South Carolina, the matter is not entirely clear. It appears that, at least
in cases involving "substantial continuing damage," the plaintiff who proves
the existence of a nuisance is entitled to injunctive relief. The leading case is
Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co.," in which the jury found that the
discharge of tailings from the defendant's gold-mining operation created a
nuisance that rendered the plaintiff's downstream property unfit for cultivation.
The supreme court quickly disposed of the defendant's argument that
injunctive relief was not warranted: "It has been too frequently held by this
court to require further discussion that, when the existence of a nuisance has
been established by the verdict of a jury, the party injured is entitled, as a
matter of right, to an injunction to prevent its continuance."I' The court
explained that this rule is rooted in the South Carolina Constitution:
Whatever may be the doctrine in other states, under the provisions of
the Constitution of this state, that private property shall not be taken for
private use without the consent of the owner, the court could not have
considered, in deciding whether to grant or refuse the injunction, the
question raised by the defendant as to the balance of convenience, or of
advantage or disadvantage to the plaintiff and defendant and the public at
large, for the defendant's use of the stream.
25 2
During the same year it decided Haile, the court considered an action to
remove, as a public nuisance, a structure across the Columbia Canal that was
used to support public water lines for the City of Columbia.25 3 The structure
was built only a few inches above the water line and thus obstructed navigation
on the canal by all but the smallest creatures. Emphasizing the state's
obligation, as trustee for the people, "to protect the valuable right of free
navigation, "I the court refused to apply a balancing test:
The right of the State and the proposed violation by the defendants of
249. Id. at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
250. 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1909).
251. Id. at 6, 66 S.E. at 118 (citing Mason v. Apalache Mills, 81 S.C. 554, 62 S.E. 399
(1908); Threatt v. Brewer Mining Co., 42 S.C. 92, 19 S.E. 1009 (1894)).
252. Id. at 7, 66 S.E. at 118. The constitutional provision referred to by the court is the
"takings clause" in S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; see supra notes 194-229 and accompanying text.
253. State ex rel. Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 63 S.E. 884 (1909).
254. Id. at 193, 63 S.E. at 890.
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that right, being perfectly clear, the Court cannot refuse to enforce the
State's right by enjoining the defendant's proposed obstruction on the
ground that the right of navigation of the Columbia Canal may be of small
value in comparison with the great value to the city of Columbia of the
obstruction it proposes to erect."
The court, however, delayed issuance of the injunction pending assurance from
the master that such a remedy would not interfere with the city's water
supplies. Presumably, this assurance was forthcoming since the court later
ordered that the structure be removed.6
Many years later, in Davis v. Palmetto Quarries Co., the defendant
argued that the trial judge erred in striking from its answer the allegation that
the quarry in question represented a "large investment" that was beneficial to
the community. Citing Haile, the supreme court upheld the ruling:
The court was influenced to strike the quoted allegations because of their
apparent purpose to raise the irrelevant question of balance of convenience
and advantage, and we agree. 58
The court was directly asked to overrule Haile in Dill v. Dance Freight
Lines, 59 in which the lower court, following a jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, issued an injunction prohibiting continuation of the nuisance. The
defendant contended that economic and social changes that had taken place
since Haile required a judicial cost-benefit analysis before an injunction could
be issued. The supreme court disagreed:
The existence of a nuisance in the instant case was clearly established,
not only by the verdict of the jury, but by the evidence in the case. The
plaintiff sought and was granted only a prohibitory injunction and we see
absolutely nothing in the facts of the instant case, or the argument of the
appellant, which would warrant this court in either modifying or overruling
the authorities hereinabove cited.'- °
At least two other cases, discussed previously, do not cite Haile, but
support the proposition that the successful plaintiff is entitled to injunctive
255. Id. at 194, 63 S.E. at 890.
256. State ex reL Lyon v. City of Columbia, 85 S.C. 113, 68 S.E. 1119 (1910) (per curiam).
257. 212 S.C. 496, 48 S.E.2d 329 (1948).
258. Id. at 500, 48 S.E.2d at 331 (citing Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66
S.E. 117 (1909)).
259. 247 S.C. 159, 146 S.E.2d 574 (1966).
260. Id. at 163-64, 146 S.E.2d at 576.
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relief-Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home 6 ' and Carter v. Lake City
Baseball Club, Inc..262
But believers in the Boomer doctrine will find several glimmers of hope
in the South Carolina case law. In Forest Land Co. v. Black,263 the court
stated in dictum that "the general rule in this country... is that the court will
balance the benefit of an injunction to the plaintiff against the inconvenience
and damage to the defendant, and grant an injunction or award damages as
seem most consistent with justice and equity under the circumstances of the
case." 2" In Johnson v. Williams,261 the court indicated its general agree-
ment with this statement from Black.26
More recently, the South Carolina Court of Appeals has expressed a
decided preference for the balancing test. In Wynock v. Carroll,267 the
court, in affirmning the trial judge's issuance of an injunction requiring the
removal of a portion of the defendant's building, stated:
[I1n determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the courts balance
the equities between the parties and are committed to the relative hardship
or a balance of convenience standard. So, ordinarily, on application for
injunctive relief, the court will, in the exercise of the wide discretion with
which it is vested, take into consideration the relative inconvenience,
hardship, or injury, which the parties will sustain by the granting or
refusal of an injunction.268
In Ravan v. Greenville County,269 the court of appeals stated that in
nuisance litigation "[t]here must be a balancing of the equities."270 For this
proposition, the court cited an Arizona case that used a balancing test to decide
whether injunctive relief was appropriate.27'
Finally, in Johnson v. Phillips,272 the court of appeals held that a jury
261. 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577 (1942).
262. 218 S.C. 255, 62 S.E.2d 470 (1950); see also Cooley v. Clifton Power Corp., 747 F.2d
258, 263 (4th Cir. 1984) (ordering defendant dam owner to lower level of lake to eliminate
flooding of plaintiff's upstream property); Mack v. Edens, 306 S.C. 433, 437, 412 S.E.2d 431,
434 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Injunction is a proper remedy for a continuous trespass to land.") (citing
McClellan v. Taylor, 54 S.C. 430, 32 S.E. 527 (1899)), cert. denied, May 6, 1992.
263. 216 S.C. 255, 57 S.E.2d 420 (1950).
264. Id. at 266-67, 57 S.E.2d at 426 (citation omitted).
265. 238 S.C. 623, 121 S.E.2d 223 (1961).
266. Id. at 639, 121 S.E.2d at 231-32.
267. 289 S.C. 338, 345 S.E.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1986).
268. Id. at 340, 345 S.E.2d at 504 (citation omitted).
269. __ S.C. _, 434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1993).
270. Id. at _, 434 S.E.2d at 307.
271. McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apartments, Ltd., 543 P.2d 150, 152 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
272. __ S.C. _, 433 S.E.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1993).
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verdict for the plaintiff of "no dollars" on a nuisance claim was either an
inconsistent or a legally incomplete verdict, and thus remanded the case for a
new trial.273 Because the issue could arise on retrial, the court also ad-
dressed whether the trial court acted properly in granting a mandatory
injunction in favor of the plaintiff:
An injunction, like all equitable remedies, is granted as a matter of
sound judicial discretion, not as a matter of legal right. A mandatory
injunction is an especially drastic remedy and is rarely granted. In most
cases, if the damage suffered by the party seeking a mandatory injunction
is very small, a mandatory injunction is unduly oppressive and not in
accordance with the principles upon which equitable relief is usually
granted. Thus, in an action for private nuisance where the damage is
nominal, the granting of a mandatory injunction, except in highly unusual
circumstances, is an abuse of discretion.
The principle is well illustrated by this case. If, in fact, the Phillipses
created a private nuisance, but it resulted in no actual damage to Smith, it
would be inequitable to require them to spend thousands of dollars to
return their land to its pre-1988 condition when Smith had suffered no
appreciable loss. In such circumstances, the balance of equities would
clearly weigh against issuing a mandatory injunction, because the economic
detriment to the plaintiff [sic] would substantially exceed the economic
benefit to the defendant [sic]. Equity would be better served by leaving
the parties in the status quo.274
This statement is certainly a ringing endorsement of the balancing test.
However, it is dictum, it is not the pronouncement of the state's highest court,
and it does not discuss Haile,27 the state's leading case. Thus, until we hear
more on this issue from the supreme court, Haile and its progeny appear to
remain alive and well.
Proponents of Boomer seek, at a minimum, heightened judicial sensitivity
to the defendant's position. In this state, there is evidence, even in the leading
injunction cases, of the court's concern for the impact of the injunction on the
273. Id. at _, 433 S.E.2d at 900-01.
274. Id. at_, 433 S.E.2d at 901-02 (citations omitted). The parties are reversed in the next-
to-last sentence of the quoted section of the opinion: The balance of equities would weigh against
the issuance of a mandatory injunction where the economic detriment to the defendant
substantially exceeds the economic benefit to the plaintiff.
275. 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1909). As this article was going to press, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals handed down its decision in LeFurgy v. Long Cove Club Owners Ass'n., Op.
No. 2168 (Ct. App. April 18, 1994) which holds that the balancing test applies in determining
whether injunctive relief should be granted in private nuisance cases. After applying this test,
the court reversed the master-in-equity's order that had permanently enjoined the operation of a
golf tee box near the plaintiff's home.
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defendant. In Haile, for example, the court on rehearing pointed out that the
injunction "must be construed as enjoining only the discharge from the
chlorination mill;"276 there is no indication that this kind of restriction meant
a shutdown of the defendant's operation. 2' In Dill, the Court stressed the
limited scope of the trial judge's injunction:
While the language of the injunctive order is rather broad and general, as
we construe the same, it only enjoins the defendant from operating its
terminal in such a manner as to continually and frequently cause the dust
complained of to be cast upon the property of the plaintiff. The defendant
is perfectly free to operate its terminal and is, of course, free to devise its
own means to prevent damaging the plaintiff in the future. 28
The public interest was uppermost in the court's mind in Columbia Water,
where the court delayed issuance of an injunction until it was assured that
obstructing the canal was not the only feasible alternative for satisfying the
water needs of the city.2 9
Thus, we see the court in these cases at least acknowledging, if not
actually balancing, the parties' interests and issuing or construing injunctions
in ways that do not result in the defendant's economic ruin. Indeed, the only
reported cases in South Carolina in which a complete shutdown of the
defendant's enterprise was ordered are Neal v. Darby20 and Fraser v. Fred
Parker Funeral Home.28 ' The former involved a hazardous waste landfill
that constituted a public nuisance, while the latter involved an exemplary
business where no change in operation could have abated the nuisance. In the
typical suit, however, the nuisance can be abated by changing the way the
defendant's facility or activity is conducted. Such changes, of course, will
usually be expensive, and the defendant will resist making them. But the
Boomer dilemma, where the change is deemed technologically impossible and
a shutdown is the only option for abating the nuisance, 2 2 rarely occurs in
nuisance cases.28 3 Moreover, the Boomer situation is less likely to occur as
276. Id. at 9, 66 S.E. at 1058.
277. Id.
278. 247 S.C. 159, 164, 146 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1966).
279. 82 S.C. 181, 195, 63 S.E. 884, 890 (1909).
280. 282 S.C. 277, 318 S.E.2d 18 (Ct. App. 1984). Even in this case, the injunction applied
only to the defendant's landfill; the reclamation operation in the adjoining county was unaffected.
281. 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577 (1942).
282. In Boomer, dissenting Judge Jasen did not believe this was the only option in Boomer.
He was convinced that the defendant, if given a period of 18 months, could develop a dust
control device that would abate the pollution. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 597 N.E.2d 870,
876 (N.Y. 1970). In fact, Judge Jasen was correct. Technology was already available (of which
the court was unaware) that could have controlled the emissions. PLATER, supra note 145, at 66.
283. See 1 RODGERS, supra note 3, § 2.13, at 119-20 ("Examples of unqualified shutdowns
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the technology for controlling the adverse effects of industrialized society
continues to develop and improve. The South Carolina courts will continue
to enjoin nuisances, but by what means and under what circumstances will be
determined only after all the facts and circumstances, including the defendant's
situation, are fully considered. 2" A balancing of interests at the remedy
stage is especially warranted if, as this article recommends, a balancing test
is not applied in determining liability.2"
VII. THE FUTURE ROLE OF COMMON LAW NUISANCE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
The doctrine of nuisance is rightfully considered "the common law
backbone" of environmental law.286 But despite the doctrine's broad
definition, it is not without limitations. Perhaps the principal limitation is that
only persons with an interest in land are afforded any protection by the
doctrine.2" Thus, a toxic tort claimant who seeks damages for personal
injuries that are unrelated to any ownership interest in land may not utilize the
nuisance doctrine. These claims are typically pursued under the laws of
negligence and strict liability.
Even where the plaintiff is a landowner, traditional nuisance principles
may not readily apply. In one well known decision, the Third Circuit refused
to allow "a purchaser of real property to recover from the seller on a private
nuisance theory for conditions existing on the very land transferred, and
thereby to circumvent limitations on vendor liability inherent in the rule of
caveat emptor. "2s Several other courts have agreed with this reasoning and
dismissed nuisance claims asserted by buyers against sellers or remote
vendors.289
of the principal economic activity at a given location remain few and far between." (footnote
omitted)).
284. Prosser and Keeton describe the rule that automatically awards an injunction to the
successful plaintiff as an "extreme view." "mhe modem and best approach is to grant the
equitable remedy of injunctive relief when the gravity of the harm from the activity exceeds the
utility of the conduct." PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 3, § 88A, at 632.
285. See supra notes 140-65 and accompanying text.
286. See 1 RODGERS, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 1-2.
287. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. The discussion here pertains to the
private nuisance cause of action. For an assessment of the importance of the public nuisance
doctrine in environmental litigation, see James A. Sevinsky, Public Nuisance: A Common Law
Remedy Among the Statutes, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 29.
288. PhiladelphiaElec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 313 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 980 (1985).
289. See Wilson Auto Enters., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101,106 (D.R.I. 1991)
(mem.) ("A buyer of property cannot assert a private nuisance claim against a seller - or the
seller's lessee - for contamination that occurred before the sale."); Hanlin Group, Inc. v.
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In fact, the New Jersey courts have moved toward strict liability as the
favored theory in environmental cases. The reasoning is that it is "more
appropriate to employ newly developed absolute liability theories than 'to
endeavor to torture old remedies to fit factual patterns not contemplated when
those remedies were fashioned.' ' 29  A leading case is State v. Ventron
Cop.,291 which involved the dumping of massive amounts of mercury into
a tidal estuary. Applying the six factor test of section 520 of the Second
Restatement of Torts, the New Jersey Supreme Court had little difficulty
finding that this dumping was an abnormally dangerous activity for which
strict liability was appropriate:
We believe it is time to recognize expressly that the law of liability has
evolved so that a landowner is strictly liable to others for harm caused by
toxic wastes that are stored on his property and flow onto the property of
others.
... [W]e conclude that mercury and other toxic wastes are "abnormal-
ly dangerous," and the disposal of them, past or present, is an abnormally
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 935 (D. Me. 1990) (concluding that
a court of law would not recognize a cause of action for private nuisance between vendor and
vendee); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 100 (D. Mass. 1990)
(mem.); Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 737 F. Supp.
1272, 1282-84 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), aft'd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); Amland Properties Corp.
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 808 (D.N.J. 1989).
The buyer, however, may have a claim against the seller (and other parties) under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA is the formidable federal law that imposes retroactive,
strict, and joint and several liability on four classes of "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs)
that are associatedwith sites contaminatedby hazardous substances. The PRPs are (1) generators
who arrange for the delivery of hazardous substances to the site, (2) transporters who select the
site, (3) prior owners or operators if the disposal occurred during the period of their ownership
or operation, and (4) current owners or operators. Id. § 9607(a). A current owner can escape
CERCLA liability by showing that the contamination predated his acquisition and that prior to
acquiring title he conducted an "appropriate inquiry" into prior uses of the property and thus had
no reason to believe contamination was present. Id. § 9601(35).
CERCLA authorizes not only the government, but any private party to sue PRPs for the
recovery of costs incurred in investigating and remediating contamination (known as "response
costs") and for declaratory relief as to future response costs. Id. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4). See generally
Jane E. Lein & Kevin M. Ward, Private Party Response Cost Recovery Under CERCLA, 21
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10322 (June 1991).
The South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Act incorporates by reference
CERCLA's liability section. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-200 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
290. Jersey City Redev. Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (D.N.J. 1987)
(quoting Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310, 1325 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985)),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Mayor & Council v. Klockner & Klockner,
811 F. Supp. 1039, 1051 (D.N.J. 1993).
291. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983).
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292dangerous activity.
Ventron is part of what has been described as a "clear trend" in the case
law toward imposing strict liability on defendants who handle hazardous
chemicals and wastes293-whether it is processing uranium,294 disposing of
radium, 295 transporting propane gas, 296 operating a hazardous waste land-
fill, 297 or spraying a weed killer.2 98
Not all jurisdictions, however, are following this trend. The New Jersey
rule of imposing strict liability on prior owners2' 9 has been rejected by at
least three jurisdictions.3 0 The New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to
apply the strict liability doctrine in an environmental contamination case unless
it could be demonstrated "that the requirement to prove legal fault acts as a
practical barrier to otherwise meritorious claims. "301 Finding no such
barrier, the court affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the strict liability
count.39 2
The Virginia Supreme Court did not recognize the handling and disposal
of pentaborane as an abnormally dangerous activity. 33 Although penta-
borane is 2,000 times as deadly as hydrogen cyanide, the court declined to
classify it as ultrahazardous because the risks associated with its handling and
disposal could be eliminated with the exercise of reasonable care.3" For the
same reason, the California Court of Appeals recently dismissed a strict
liability case involving sulfuric acid.305 In Connecticut, where the state
292. Id. at 157, 160 (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 520).
293. SUSAN M. COOKE, THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE § 17.01(5)(a) at 17-74. See
generally Jim C. Chen & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Application of the Abnormally Dangerous
Activities Doctrine to Environmental Cleanups, 47 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1992).
294. Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
295. T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991).
296. National Steel Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1982) (en banc).
297. Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (mem.).
298. Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961).
299. See, e.g., Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 801-07
(D.N.J. 1989); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1257-59 (N.J. 1991).
300. See, e.g., Wilson Auto Enters., Inc. V. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101,106 (D.R.I.
1991); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust V. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 100 (D. Mass 199);
Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Cts. (Eastern), Inc., 578 So. 2d 363, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991)(per curiam).
301. Bagley v. Controlled Env't Corp., 503 A.2d 823, 826 (N.H. 1986).
302. Id. at 829.
303. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268 (Va. 1988).
304. Id. at 282. Relying on Emerson, a Virginia federal court held that the handling, storage,
and disposal of products containing PCBs was not an abnormally dangerous activity. Richmond,
F. & P. R.R. v. Davis Indus., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 572, 575-76 (E.D. Va. 1992) (mem.).
305. Edwards v. Post Transp. Co., 279 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Ct. App. 1991).
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courts have recognized only blasting and pile driving as abnormally dangerous,
a federal district court refused to extend the doctrine to a metal finishing
operation.
30 6
It is difficult to detect a trend in South Carolina. To date the supreme
court has declared only blasting as ultrahazardous, 3" whereas the court of
appeals has strongly rejected application of the strict liability doctrine in a case
involving leaking water.30 8 But in cases involving leaking hazardous waste,
federal and state trial judges in South Carolina have submitted to the jury the
question of whether a defendant is strictly liable for engaging in an abnormally
dangerous activity. 309 In Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.,3"' the feder-
al district court stated that "strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities as
expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 is firmly established
in the common law of South Carolina."" On appeal, however, the Fourth
Circuit held that this assessment of South Carolina law was erroneous because
it "currently does not recognize strict liability for damages caused by
hazardous waste disposal or reclamation."312
The South Carolina Supreme Court will have the final word on the scope
of the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine. In cases involving an activity
found to be abnormally dangerous, the nuisance cause of action will probably
be of secondary importance, but relatively few activities will fall into that
category even under the broadest definition of the term. For the many other
activities of an industrialized society that are not abnormally dangerous, but
nonetheless interfere with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's property, the
common law of nuisance will continue to be the principal cause of action by
which relief can be obtained.
306. Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238, 1251 (D. Conn.
1992).
307. See supra notes 97-119 and accompanying text. The discussion here pertains only to the
common law, but South Carolina has statutorily imposed strict liability on certain activities. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (selling defective products); id. § 55-3-60
(operating aircraft); id. § 48-1-90 (liability for pollution is strict; see Carolina Chems., Inc. v.
South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 290 S.C. 498, 351 S.E.2d 575 (Ct. App.
1986)).
308. Snow v. City of Columbia, 305 S.C. 544, 409 S.E.2d 797 (Ct. App. 1991).
309. See, e.g., Shockley v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 793 F. Supp. 670 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 996 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Ravan v. Greenville County,
__ S.C. _, 434 S.E.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1993). In these cases, the courts have not adhered to the
Restatement's position that it is for the court, not the jury, to determine whether the defendant
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 520 cmt. 1.
310. 793 F. Supp. 670 (D.S.C. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 996 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir.
1993) (per curiam).
311. Id. at 673.
312. Shockley, 996 F.2d 1212 (table disposition), 1993 WL 241179, at *5.
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